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Abstract 
 The EU is one of the world’s biggest importers of bananas and, as such, import policies 
enforced by this trade union are likely to have a great impact on major producers of bananas. 
Aiming to protect communitarian producers and exporters from selected ex-colonies of Africa, 
the Caribbean and Pacific and to honor previous agreements, the EU unified its import policy for 
bananas in 1993. This policy, known as the Common Market Organization for Bananas, 
generated one of the most controversial trade disputes in history. After several modifications of 
the original regime, in January 2006, the EU changed its import regime to satisfy a World Trade 
Organization mandate and to honor an agreement signed with the United States in 2000. 
This dissertation reviews the history of the trade disputes in the EU banana market and 
analyzes the effects that the new import regime will have on major suppliers. To do this, a 
theoretically-consistent demand system is estimated and then the calculated parameters are used 
to model the effects of the tariff-only import system in the EU banana market. Based on the 
results, producers surplus are estimated and Monte Carlo simulations are performed to do a 
sensitivity analysis of the results.  
In the demand estimation component, the EU market is modeled as a system containing 
four major suppliers using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). This estimation fills an 
important gap in literature regarding the lack of well-estimated demand elasticities of bananas in 
the EU.  
The EU banana market is then modeled based on a equilibrium displacement model 
framework. Results of this analysis are then used to calculate point estimates of producer surplus 
changes as a measure of the impact of the new import policy on banana suppliers. Monte Carlo 
simulations are based on parameter estimates obtained from the AIDS model. These simulations 
allowed not only sensitivity analysis but also probabilistic inferences about the statistical 
significance of the estimates obtained in the previous components.  
Results indicate that the hypothesis that the new import regime will not affect the major 
suppliers of the EU banana market cannot be rejected. This might indicate that the policy 
enforced by the Common Market Organization for Bananas and the current tariff-only import 
 
regime are statistically equivalent. In other words, the EU expertly enacted a tariff level that will 
leave much as status quo. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
The European Union (EU) banana market has been of enormous interest to researchers 
for more than a decade. Even prior to the policy unification brought by the Common Market 
Organization for bananas (CMOB) in 1993 many authors had studied the implications of the 
multi policy scheme. Between 1993 and 2000, researchers closely followed the many 
developments in this market, making it one of the world’s most analyzed agricultural markets. 
The keen interest was due to the constant conflicts among different groups with competing 
interests. Evidence of this struggle is the several consultation processes and challenges brought 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that resulted in three major modifications of the CMOB 
between 1993 and 1999.  
What made it so difficult for the EU to define an import system that pleased every party 
was the fact that national interests from at least three different regions were in play. On one 
hand, the EU wanted to maintain the preferred access its former colonies had historically 
received.  The EU also wanted to protect its own producers, mainly from Spain, Greece, Portugal 
and France. On the other hand, WTO pressured the EU had to ensure certain market access and 
fairer treatment to Latin American producers. Fair access to the EU market for Latin American 
bananas was also in the interest of the United States, on behalf of its multinational fruit 
companies.   
In 2001, the EU import system for bananas received attention when the United States 
(US) and the EU agreed to put an end to the so-called banana war. As part of the agreement, the 
EU made a commitment to eliminating its quota-tariff import regime by 2006 and replacing it 
with a tariff-only import system.  
The controversy inspired authors to analyze the EU banana market extensively. However, 
besides the many times the EU banana market has been studied, there are still large gaps to fill in 
the literature. For example, measures of the economic impact of the CMOB differ substantially. 
Divergences in the results are found not only in the magnitude of the effects but also in the way 
the involved parties have been affected by the alternative import policies. One of the main 
reasons for those discrepancies is that for each evaluation, a different set of demand modeling 
techniques has been used. A common denominator to the estimations is that the general demand 
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restrictions necessary to make them consistent with economic theory have not been incorporated. 
Table 1.1 summarizes a few of the demand elasticity set-ups and the welfare effects that some 
authors have estimated for the EU banana market. 
Welfare estimations are highly sensitive to the demand parameters used to parameterize 
the market. Now that a new banana import agreement has emerged in the EU, an adequate 
estimation of its import demand becomes relevant from a policy analysis perspective.  
The objective of this project is to estimate a theoretically consistent demand system to 
generate reliable parameters to facilitate welfare analysis of the new EU import regime for 
bananas. Simulations, based on Monte Carlo analysis, to calculate welfare effects of the new 
import regime on major banana suppliers of this market are also performed.  
The study is organized as follows. Chapter two gives a detailed background of the EU 
import banana market. Chapter three presents the methodology used to estimate the import 
demand system of bananas in the EU, discusses the data used and presents results. Chapter four 
details the equilibrium displacement model (EDM) used to estimate the welfare effects of the 
new EU import system. Chapter five presents the methodology used to estimate precision 
measures of welfare effects and discusses the results obtained. Chapter six concludes.  
Figure 1.1 outlines the way four of the major components of this dissertation are related. 
Elasticity results from the Almost Ideal Demand System model (AIDS) are used to parameterize 
the equilibrium displacement model (EDM). Other parameter such as supply elasticities and 
trade policy variables are taken from existent literature and calculated based on assumptions 
about the two import regimes. Changes in prices and quantities obtained from solving the EDM 
model are used as inputs of the welfare analysis. Afterwards, Monte Carlo simulations are 
performed based on AIDS parameters and their standard deviations and variance-covariance 
matrix to generate new parameter distributions. Each of those set of parameters are used to solve 
for the AIDS and EDM models, which ultimately allows me to generate distributions of price, 
quantity and producer surplus changes. 
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Table 1-1 Summary of demand elasticities used in evaluations of the EU banana market 
 
Source Method for 
calculating 
Elasticities(a)
Comparison 
period 
Welfare cost for 
EU consumers(b)
Borell and Yang (1990) Elasticities assumed Before 1993 693 
Matthews (1992) Elasticities assumed 
based on prior studies 
Before 1993 579 
Borell and Cuthbertson quoted 
in Matthews 1992 
Elasticities assumed Before 1993 1438 
Borell and Yang (1992) Elasticities assumed Before 1993 1610 
McInerney and Person (1992)  Before 1993 1600 
Read (1994) Unpublished Before 1993 642 
Borell (1994) Elasticities assumed After 1993 2300 
Euro PA (1995) Same as Borell  After 1993 800-1000 
 Source: H. Kox. 
(a)  Values not reported. 
(b) Million US$ 
 
 Figure 1-1 Structure of the analysis and relationship between each estimated component 
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CHAPTER 2 -  A Historical Overview of the European Union 
Banana Import Policy 
The economic importance of the EU banana market is evident in the history of trade 
disputes that have enveloped it for years. There is such a diversity of concerns at play that 
satisfying everybody’s interests has been a nearly impossible task not only for the EU, but for the 
US, Latin America, Africa and the WTO. Even among the same interest groups there is often 
disagreement on the way import restrictions on this market should be administered. Consider, for 
example, Latin American producers who stand to gain the most from an open market. While 
Costa Rica advocates for a gradual elimination of the current import tariff to avoid an immediate 
overflow of the European market that would excessively decrease export prices, its neighbors 
believe that immediate deregulation of Europe is the sensible course of action (La Nación, 2006).  
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the main events that have characterized the 
conflict among the European Union, Latin American countries, African, Caribbean and Pacific 
nations and the United States regarding banana imports into the EU. It is organized as follows. 
Section 1 describes the EU policy structure prior to the establishment of the Common Market 
Organization for Bananas (CMOB) in 1993. Section 2 describes the CMOB as it was originally 
conceived. Section 3 discuses the various trade disputes held between 1993 and 2002 related to 
the import regime brought by the CMOB. Section 4 the EU’s perspective of the so-called banana 
war. Finally, section 5 details the agreement reached between the EU and the US in 2002 and the 
eventual transition to the new import regime that came into effect in January of 2006. 
EU import policy prior to 1993 
The EU is primarily a customs union, which implies that each member nation must abide 
by a common set of import and export policies. Prior to 1993 however, bananas were exempt 
from the union. The 1993 policy to bring bananas under a unified tariff structure essentially lead 
to an amalgamation of the variety of prior banana import policies prevalent in member countries. 
Thus, in order to understand how the current regime exists, it is necessary to understand from 
whence it came. 
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Prior to 1993, there were three general agreements that ruled the European banana 
market: (i) a common external tariff of 20% applied to non-preferred suppliers; (ii) the Lomé 
Convention1, that gave preferential treatment to the banana imports from former European 
colonies; and, (iii) the Treaty of Rome2 that allowed France, Italy and the United Kingdom to 
protect their preferred suppliers. Additionally, a special protocol of the Treaty of Rome permitted 
Germany to import duty free bananas from any country (IICA, 1995). In addition to these 
stipulations, each country was allowed to define its own banana import policy. This explains the 
wide variety of import regimes among the EU prior the definition of the Common Market 
Organization.  
From that variety of policies, it is possible to define three categories of countries within 
the policies. The first group includes the mostly closed markets that protected their traditional 
suppliers from the ACP region over non-preferred producers, mainly from Latin America (see 
Table 2.1). This group comprises Italy, Spain, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom. These 
countries conferred preferential treatment to other favored nations and granted a minimum price 
for their bananas. Additionally, they imposed a quota in order to limit imports from third 
countries (Borrel, 1992). The second group comprises those countries that only applied the 20% 
common tariff to non-preferred suppliers with the objective of protecting the ACP countries. The 
third category includes Germany, Austria, Sweden and Finland3. These nations advocated for 
free trade and gave boundless access to its market to all suppliers. For a summary of the 
prevalent national policies before 1993, see Table 2.2.  
France constituted one of the most protective markets. It reserved around 2/3 of the 
market for its overseas departments (Martinique and Guadeloupe) and one third for French 
speaking African countries, mainly Cameroon, Côte d’Ivory, and Madagascar (IICA, 1995). It is 
                                                 
1 The Lomé Convention is an agreement between the EU and 71 countries from Africa, The Caribbean, and Pacific 
first signed on February of 1975. It gives to these countries trade preferences for a group of commodities they are 
highly dependent on. Protocol number 5 of the Convention deals with the banana trade. It states that no ACP country 
will be made worse off in terms of its access to traditional markets and its preferred states. Specifically, this protocol 
allows ACP countries to export duty free bananas to the EU. 
 
2 The Banana Protocol of the Treaty of Rome (March 1957) allows the European Union Commission to concede 
permits to its members states to restrict banana imports from other nations. The protocol states two requirements for 
such a restriction: (i) the good must be produced in the other nation and; (ii) the restriction must safeguard any 
quotas the interested nation has. 
3 Austria, Finland and Sweden were not part of the EU at this time. 
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estimated that in the period 1985-1987, about 94% of the French market was reserved to its 
overseas territories and former colonies (Borrel, 1992). Imports from third countries were 
licensed and allowed only when import prices reached a minimum level. Latin American imports 
were limited to an annual 270,000 tons and were taxed with the 20% common tariff.  
The United Kingdom granted free access to Commonwealth producers such as Jamaica, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Suriname and Belize. Imports from other 
countries were subject to a license system and were only allowed when there existed a shortage 
in the favored supply. Additionally, the 20% common import tariff was applied to these imports. 
After 1989, a licensed minimum level of 30,000 tons was established for Latin American 
producers. Borrel estimated that three quarters of the market was granted to preferred suppliers 
(1992). 
Italy allowed free access to imports from EC territories and ACP countries, Somalia 
being its traditional supplier. A 270,000-ton quota was established to limit imports from other 
nations in 1983. This regulation remained in place until the approval of the 1993 import regime. 
Portugal and Spain restricted their banana imports to protect their own producers; 
Madeira, in the case of Portugal, and the Canary Islands, in the case of Spain. Both markets were 
closed to Latin American bananas other than in exceptional circumstances. Greece also limited 
access to its market in order to protect its domestic production setting a prohibitive import tax on 
bananas from other regions (Borrel, 1992).  
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg granted free market privileges 
to the traditional ACP suppliers. Although these countries did not have overseas banana 
producing territories, the benefits they conceded to the ACP nations were those regulated under 
the Lomé Convention.  
The consequence of the EU policy structure, compared to a situation with free access for 
all producers, was reductions in overall banana imports, lower world prices but increased prices 
for EU consumers and preferred region producers. As a result, preferred region production 
increased, which further exacerbated the problems related to lower world prices in other regions, 
particularly Latin America. The way in which the EU import licenses were written generated rent 
seeking behavior on the part of banana importers (Borrell, 1997). 
Import restrictions were calculated to cost European consumers $1.6 billion a year. 
Further, despite the fact that one justification of the import program was foreign aid, only $300 
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million (of the $1.6 billion) was paid to ACP producers. Additionally, it cost $100 million a year 
to other developing countries due to the lost export opportunities (Borrell, 1997).  
The cost for society has not been calculated on a world scale. Clearly, however, the 
incentives encouraged less efficient producers to use resources in the production of bananas and 
reduced production in some of the more efficient regions4. Removing the pre-1993 EU policy 
structure would have led to welfare gains for the global economy. 
The Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB) 
The EU Common Market Organization for Bananas represented the consolidation of 
various efforts to regulate the market. The first attempt was in the mid seventies, when the main 
Latin American exporters argued for the necessity of organizing the market in order to overcome 
overproduction and low world prices. Although the implementation of a Common Market was 
seen as a reinforcement of customs union doctrine, (WTO, 1997), its main goal was to balance 
opposing interests of diverse groups affected by the hodgepodge of national-level import 
policies. With the implementation of the 1993 Agreement, free intra-EU movement of bananas 
was allowed, and the EU took a position of reaching three main importer-nation objectives 
(Patiño, 2000): 
1. To assure overseas territories would get higher prices to compensate their more 
elevated production costs. 
2. To fulfill the commitments with ACP countries made through the Lomé 
Convention.  
3. To ensure consumers an adequate supply with good quality bananas from third 
countries (Borrell, 1997). Since prior to 1993, Latin American bananas 
represented 99.36% of non-preferred production, all the rules directed at this 
group referred essentially to Latin America or dollar bananas5 (CORBANA, 
1993). 
                                                 
4 In 1998, it was estimated that a ton of bananas produced in Latinamerica cost on average $162. The production 
cost of a ton of bananas produced in overseas territories of the EU reached $500 (Cascavel, 1998). 
5 Since a large portion of the Latin American banana exports are dominated by US companies, bananas from this 
destination are also called dollar bananas. 
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During the Uruguay Round negotiations, Switzerland, Japan, Finland, Korea and New 
Zealand offered to liberalize their banana market. In opposition to these initiatives, the European 
Union decided not to include the banana trade in its negotiations. This position was evident with 
the ratification of the 1993 regulation, which further restricted the EU banana market. However, 
this new regime was not compatible with the WTO “most favored nation” clause since it 
conceded trade preferences to ACP nations over the suppliers (IICA, 1995). 
The 1993 Agreement defined a specific set of importing guidelines for overseas 
territories and for how ACP and non-preferred suppliers would be allowed to export. A quota for 
each supplier category was set. Overseas territory and ACP exports were duty free up to the 
amount specified by the quota. An initial tariff of ECU 100 per ton was imposed on intra quota 
imports for third suppliers, mainly Latin America. The regime also allowed free movement of 
bananas among the European Union. 
To protect production in overseas territories and ensure producers from those regions a 
minimum income, exports up to a maximum of 854,000 tons were eligible for deficiency 
payments6. The payment was defined as the difference between the market price and a reference 
price determined by the EU. Exports over these quantities were not covered by the compensation 
system. To guarantee that all countries benefited, a maximum import amount subject to 
compensation was assigned to each one. This maximum level was allocated based on the 
historical quantities exported by each country. However, the limits imposed were greater than the 
1991 average export amount (see Table 2.3). Communitarian suppliers were also eligible for 
additional compensatory assistance. Producers who had to abandon banana production were 
subject to an indemnity. To qualify, they had to either cease all production if their plantation is 
less than five hectares or at least 50% if it was greater than eight hectares (CORBANA, 1993).  
ACP countries were split into two groups: traditional and non-traditional suppliers. ACP 
traditional imports consisted of bananas exported by ACP countries in annual historic quantities. 
The non-traditional category incorporated imports from traditional ACP suppliers over the 
quantities habitually exported and imports from other ACP countries that did not produce 
bananas prior to 1993. Exports from this group were treated as if they were from non-preferred 
suppliers and taxed with a 750 ECU/ton tariff. Traditional ACP exporters enjoyed duty free 
access up to 857,700 tons as well as any other quantity imported when unfilled quotas occurred 
                                                 
6 These payments were made by the EU. 
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from the non-preferred suppliers. The quota was split among the countries according to the 
traditional amount exported for each (Table 2.4).  
This treatment of over-quota exports was the only modification traditional ACP exporters 
faced relative to their situation prior to 1993. Under the Lomé Convention Agreement, traditional 
ACP countries were not restricted at all in their duty-free imports. However, with the exception 
of Cameroon, the quotas imposed on each country did not limit their exports. As shown in Table 
2.4, nearly all of the export levels of the ACP countries were below the maximum duty-free 
quantities allowed from 1994 to 2000. One exception was Cameroon, whose banana exports 
were greater than the duty free quota in 1999 and 2000.  
For non-preferred exporters, the Common Market Organization introduced an aggregate 
tariff-quota of 2 million tons. These imports were charged a 100 ECU/T tariff (equivalent to a 
20% ad-valorem tax). Over-quota imports were subject to a levy of 850 ECU/T (comparable to a 
170% ad-valorem taxation CORBANA, 1993). The quota was subject to change depending on 
the projected market situation each year. This projection would be based on predicted European 
consumption and preferred supplier’s production. Changes in Latin American production were 
not considered however, and Latin America was the only region whose allocation was smaller 
than the quantities it exported to the EU prior 1993 (see Table 2.5). 
The new regime also created an import license system to distribute the non-preferred 
quota among importers. The allowance was split into three categories of operators on the basis of 
historical quantities imported. Category A comprised traditional banana importers from Latin 
America. They were allowed to import 66.5% of the 2 million tons quota. Category B 
corresponded to operators who traditionally imported bananas from preferred suppliers. They 
were authorized to import 30% of the quota assigned to Latin American producers. A category C 
was created to reserve import rights for new importers established in 1992. They got the last 
3.5% of the import quota assigned to Latin American exporters.  
Transference of import licenses was allowed between importers of the same category and 
among importers of categories A and B. It was not permissible to transfer licenses from or to 
category C. However, the principles that ruled the license transference were different for each 
category and harmed Latin American operators. For instance, if an importer of category A, sold 
its import license to a category-B operator, the seller lost its license for the next period. 
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However, if the transaction was in the opposite direction, from category B to A, this rule did not 
hold and the B operator was able to make use of its license the next period. 
CMOB related events after its approval in 1993 
The European policy has been extremely controversial since its creation in 1993. It faced 
numerous obstacles with most of the involved parts in the market, leading in most cases, to 
modifications of the original policy.  
Although the Latin American countries, as a region, do not enjoy the same economic 
power as the European Union, they have been proactive with regard to modifications to the 1993 
import system leading to three of the major adjustments. The United States, representing its 
multinational firms, also had an important role in the so called banana war challenging the EU 
import regime several times. 
For exposition purposes, adjustments to the banana import policy are split into two 
chronological periods. The first covers changes that occurred between 1993 and the 1999 WTO 
declaration that the European import system was illegal. During this period, the 1993 regime was 
modified, but its main guidelines stayed the same. The second period covers changes after the 
WTO declaration in 1999 through 2001. The last WTO resolution urged the EU to modify its 
policy. In this sub-section, the failed attempts to define a new import policy to please everybody 
are presented. It also describes the background for the EU-US 2001 agreement. 
The first adjustment to the regime was made in 1994 when Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela and Nicaragua reached an agreement with the EU in the context of the Uruguay 
Round Negotiations (GATT). In this occasion, the quota was raised to 2.1 million T. Then in 
1995, with the conclusion of Uruguay Round negotiations, at the request of Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, the quota was increased to 2.2 million tons and the in-quota 
tariff was reduced from 100 ECU to 75 ECU/T. Additionally, these countries negotiated a fixed 
participation in the quota applied to the Latin American exporters. Costa Rica and Colombia 
obtained the greater portion with 23.4% and 21% of the global quota respectively. Nicaragua got 
3% and Venezuela 2% of the allowance. The parties were allowed to trade the import rights 
among themselves. However, the agreement was canceled in 1998, when Germany and Belgium 
requested an inquiry by the Justice Tribunal of the EU. The quota allocation was considered 
illegal, since the export rights discriminated among operators. 
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An additional modification to the quota to Latin American exporters was introduced in 
1995. A temporary tariff quota of 353,000 tons was added when Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joined the European Union. Nonetheless, the increase in quota was not large enough to match the 
imports levels these countries had prior their accessing to the European Union. As shown in 
Table 2.6, total imports of this group during the period 1990-1994 were greater than the 
additional quota approved. Indeed, the growth tendency shown by these countries imports 
stopped once they joined the European Union. The additional allowance applied until 1997, 
when the third countries quota was set back at 2,200,000 tons.  
It is interesting that the EU banana regime not only caused difficulties between the EU 
and the affected parties, but also divided the Latin American block. As a consequence of the 
quota allocation agreement negotiated by some nations, the Latin American unit split into two 
groups. One comprised those countries that accepted the new import regime: Costa Rica, 
Venezuela, Nicaragua and Colombia. The other comprised nations that advocated for an 
alternative system: Ecuador, México, Honduras, Guatemala and Panamá.  
The US supported the later group claiming that its firms were harmed by the EU import 
regime. In fact, the US multinational firms felt more threatened when Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela negotiated their allocations. The US firms argued that their economic 
interest would be harmed if the national quotas were executed because most of their production 
was not allocated in those countries.  
Because of this discontent, the US government started an investigation process to 
determine if the actions taken by those countries truly harmed the US firms’ interests. The US 
threatened to impose economic sanctions on the nations that accepted the import regime if the 
harm to its companies were proved. As a result, Nicaragua and Venezuela resigned the 
agreement and did not execute the allocated quotas assigned to them. On the other hand, 
Colombia and Costa Rica ratified the agreement.  
The US government threatened Costa Rica and Colombia with suspending the 
commercial benefits these countries enjoy as part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). This is 
a unilateral preferential treatment between the United Stares and countries from the Caribbean 
Area. It allows duty free entrance to exports from the benefited countries to the United States 
territory, including the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The final resolution was on favor of 
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Costa Rica and Colombia. The US government understood they acted in defense of their interest, 
considering the high dependence of these countries’ economies to the banana activity. 
In 1997, the United States, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico requested a hearing of the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organizations against the EU (Ecuador and 
Panama supported the action but did not take part since they were not being WTO members at 
that time). This group argued that the EU’s import policy harmed their interests and favored ACP 
suppliers.  
The WTO’s resolution partially favored the EU. The Dispute Settlement Body 
determined that based on the Lomé Convention, the EU was right to concede preferences to the 
ACP nations. However, some effects of the new import system were found to be in opposition to 
WTO rules, the Agreement on Import and Licenses Procedures, and the General Agreement on 
Trade and Services. The WTO affirmed that this system unfairly discriminated against some 
importing and marketing firms in Latin America. As a result, the EU adopted a modified set of 
import policies that entered into force in January 1999. Three principal changes were introduced: 
a) The four “substantial suppliers” of the EC (Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Panama) were allocated specific shares of tariff-quotas A and B on the basis of the 
1994-1996 period. 
b) The country-specific sub-quotas within the quota for countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries) were abolished.  
c) The complex system of import license allocation was simplified by reducing the 
number of market operator types from 7 to 2 (traditional and newcomer operators). 
These adjustments came in the context of a greater liberalization of the EU’s agriculture 
sector and its commitment with the WTO. The adapted import system safeguarded the 
commitment the EU had with the traditional ACP suppliers and, at the same time, the EU could 
meet its obligations with the WTO. 
In 1999, Ecuador and the US confronted the European policy again and brought another 
demand to the WTO. These countries were not pleased with the modifications enforced in 1999 
by the EU. This time, the case was resolved in favor of Ecuador and the US. The resolution 
imposed an important precedent in the WTO since it was the first time a developing country was 
authorized to execute economic sanctions on a developed block. The same resolution applied to 
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the US7. Additionally, the EU was asked to make further changes to its banana import regime, in 
order to make it compatible with the WTO specifications.  
After the WTO declared the European banana import system illegal in 2000, the 
European Union Commission started a consultation process with the involved parts. Its goal was 
to define a new WTO compatible policy generally accepted by the parties. By the end of 1999, 
the Commission proposed a “tariff only” system that would be introduced in 2006. Meanwhile, it 
suggested adopting a transitional tariff quota system with preferential access for ACP producers. 
The proposal suggested maintaining type A and B quotas during the transitional period. The first 
staying on its previous 2.2 million tons charged with a EUR75/ton. The type B quota would be 
autonomous and for an amount of 353,000 tons for which the EUR75/ton tariff would also apply. 
Additionally, it considered the creation of a new autonomous quota (type C) of 850.000 tons. 
ACP exports would enter duty free under any quota category.  
None of the parties expressed any kind of disagreement with this component of the 
proposal. The conflict with the parties started when the Commission communicated its intention 
of conceding the import licenses on a historical basis. A new period of consultation started.  
After seven months of discussion with the parties, the Commission announced a new 
import license distribution system. It was based on its initial proposal of license concessions 
based on a historical reference period but also considered a proposal made by the Caribbean 
countries and redefined the operators that would have access to the quotas.  
The proposal was not accepted by the US operators nor by some Latin American 
producers. The US opposition held even though the Commission estimated that US operators 
would fall into the new definition and therefore would increase their market share. A new 
dialogue process started with the objective of reaching an agreement about the historical 
reference period for the license allocation. Once again, the process did not yield any agreement 
between the parts (Commission of the European Communities. October, 2000). 
At this point, the Commission initiated an evaluation of a quota system based on the “first 
come, first served” system. It was considered the last option to define an import policy 
compatible with the WTO rules and that would please the involved parts. The EU recognized 
                                                 
7 The US increased by 100%the import tariff on European products such as textiles, cheese, jam and cookies. The 
sanctions affected all Communitarian countries but Netherlands and Denmark. The US government claimed this tax 
would compensate for the estimated $520 million losses US firms have had as a result of the EU import banana 
policy (La Nación, 1999) 
 14
many advantages in the “first come, first served” system. First, it was a WTO compatible import 
structure. In fact, the WTO defined it as a “well-suited” system for the management of tariff 
quotas in its resolution of the Ecuador panel in 1999. Specifically, it represented the solution to 
the quota management problem for it would imply the elimination of national quota allocations 
and definition of operators. The distinction between traditional and newcomer operators would 
disappear. In addition, the rent shifting originated by the trade in license would be overcome 
(Commission of the European Communities. October, 2000). 
However, there were some weaknesses attached to the system that required an adequate 
solution by the EU. For example, the perishable character of bananas requires the period between 
transportation from the production center and the arrival of the fruit to be limited. The proposed 
system could delay the process. Moreover, there was the possibility of technical difficulties in 
the ports because of a larger number of shipments that may congestion them. Additionally, there 
were also budgetary implications for the EU. Under the new import structure, the banana supply 
would increase in the market driving the price down. This would have raised the compensatory 
payments to community producers (Commission of the European Communities. October, 2000). 
Not surprisingly, each party claimed some kind of modification to the proposal that 
would fit their interests. Some of them even advocated for a different system. For example, most 
operators favored an import regime based on historical references. Their main argument was that 
the proposed system would reinforce the large operators’ position to the detriment of the small 
and medium sized ones. They claimed that the larger operators were more capable of negotiating 
shipping arrangements (Commission of the European Communities. October, 2000). 
European community producers were indifferent to the system since the compensatory 
payments would have covered any decrease in their incomes. On the contrary, the ACP 
producers favored the maintenance of the quota system as long as possible. However, even 
though the new system did not perfectly fit their interests, the foreseen increase in the tariff 
preference in one of the quotas was on their benefit (Commission of the European Communities. 
October, 2000). 
The system never came into effect however, primarily because of US opposition. At this 
point the EU started the bilateral negotiations with the US that brought the EU-US agreement in 
2001 discussed in the next section. But, before moving on to this, it is important to mention the 
economics impacts some authors have estimated the CMOB had on the involved parts. 
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The 1993 policy resulted in higher priced bananas for EU consumers. Many studies have 
been conducted since the introduction of this policy to determine it’s effects on European 
countries’ welfare. All of them agree that German consumers were the most affected. Imports to 
this country were estimated to decrease by 250 thousand tons compared to the initial free market 
situation. German consumer’s welfare lost was calculated at $50 million (Kersten, 1995). On the 
other hand, consumers in countries that had restrictive import policies, such as France and UK, 
were made better off. In those countries, real import price of bananas decreased with the 
introduction of the new regime. A similar situation occurred in Spain, Portugal, and Greece 
(Kox, 1998).  
However, despite the gains for some countries, total consumer welfare decreased in the 
European market. Consumer’s losses for the EU (excluding Germany) were calculated at 
approximately $640 million compared to the market situation that prevailed before 1993 
(Kersten, 1995 and Borrel, 1997). 
Additionally, the goal of protecting developing countries was inefficiently, and just 
partially, reached. The 1993 regime imposed costly resource transference from one group of 
underdeveloped nations to another. It is estimated that Latin American nations incurred a cost of 
$0.32 ($98 million a year) for every dollar of aid reaching preferred suppliers (Kersten, 1995 and 
Borrel, 1997). 
EU perspective on the CMOB and the banana war 
In addition to the viewpoint of the third parties affected, it is important to consider the 
European perception and justification for the banana regime. One of the main reasons it was 
justified was the need to fulfill the requirements established by the European Single Market 
(ESM). This policy intended to increase welfare through a higher level of competition and 
efficiency. Therefore, defenders of the CMOB argue that this policy had a justifiable goal: to 
benefit domestic producers and consumers of bananas within the EU border. Furthermore, there 
is sufficiently proof that the European Single Market was indeed successful at enhancing global 
welfare when considering the policy as a whole  (Allen, C., M. Gasiorek and A. Smith, 1998). 
Therefore, it would be valid to claim that the CMOB is an exception to the success the more 
global policy had. 
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As a second goal, the policy was meant to protect the economies of the ACP nations. 
These countries are alleged to be highly dependent on the banana sector and any sudden 
adjustment in their productive structure would have had devastating social consequences8. 
However, when analyzing the economic structure of both groups of countries, the levels of 
development and the dependency on the banana sector are not valid arguments to justify the EU 
policy. As discussed earlier, the 1993 regimen imposed extremely high costs for Latin American 
countries, also developing nations. 
Many of the ACP countries have income levels comparable or higher than European 
countries as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and most former states of the Soviet Union. Based on 
their Human Development index most of them are considered among the medium developed 
nations9. On the other hand, with some exceptions, most of the Latin American countries are 
doing very poorly in development related matters. Large parts of these countries populations 
remain in extreme poverty (see Table 2.7). 
Evaluating dependency on the sector, a study performed by Kox in 1998 found that 
banana exports to the EU represent only three to seven percent of total export earnings for the 
poorest ACP countries. Meanwhile, banana exports contribute to domestic income in Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama three to eight times more than in most ACP countries. 
In addition to the economic justification of the CMOB, there are also political reasons 
that, under the European point of view, made the adopted system preferable to a free trade 
alternative. One of the stronger arguments is that under free trade, the EU would have had to 
make direct payments to the communitarian and ACP producers. These payments would have 
compensated the losses that those producers had faced for the cancellation of their preferred 
treatment. The EU claimed they did not have the resources necessary to make the required direct 
transference. Even if they had had the budget, none of the benefited parties felt comfortable with 
the idea of getting resources in such a fashion. Additionally and maybe more important, both the 
EU and the ACP nations worried about the social consequences that adjustment in their 
productive structure would have (Tangermann, 1997). 
                                                 
8 For example, 70% Saint Vincent population’s revenue depends directly and indirectly on the banana sector. One of 
every three people in Saint Lucia depends on this activity. Finally, 60% of the revenue perceived by the four EU 
overseas territories comes from banana production. 
 
9 Cameroon and Cote d’Ivory constitutes the exceptions. 
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Another argument used by the CMOB defenders is that this policy was not as costly as 
has been estimated. Most studies make their welfare estimations based on the situation prevalent 
in 1991 and 1992, i.e. Borrel. However, this period is alleged not to be representative of the real 
tendency in the market because the Latin American exporters increased their shipments 
forecasting a change in the policy (Tangermann, 1997). However, defenders of this idea left an 
important question unanswered: how were the Latin American exporters able to increase their 
shipments if most of the European market was protected under the multi-policy situation prior to 
1993? Furthermore, even if the estimated welfare effects of the 1993 policy were overestimated, 
nobody can claim that the transference system imposed by this policy was highly inefficient. 
European Union consumers and producers from developing countries were taxed in order to 
transfer resources to another group. 
Agreement between the US and the EU 
After eight years of controversy (1993-2000), the European Union negotiated a 
settlement that would put an end to the CMOB. It involved in addition to the traditional nations 
implicated in the banana dispute, the US in representation of its multinational fruit companies 
operating in Latin America. Both the United States and the European Union agreed to modify 
their commercial policy related to the banana dispute.  
The agreement was conceived in two stages. The first phase came into effect in July 
2001. It established a temporary elimination of a 100% ad valorem tariff the US had imposed on 
imports of certain European goods. This tariff was applied by the US as a sanction to the EU for 
the banana dispute held with the Latin American countries. Additionally, the U.S. agreed to drop 
its hold to the Lomé Convention, allowing the waiver to Article I of the GATT to pass. The 
European Union agreed to allocate two more 100,000 ton quotas for Latin American bananas and 
to eliminate a third quota for the ACP countries. The distribution of quotas was based on 
historical allocations of import licenses using the years 1994-1996 as the reference period10.  
The second stage started in July 2002, when the European Parliament had to amend the 
existent banana legislation. A difference of this phase respect to the first stage of the agreement 
was that it did not have a definitive schedule for its implementation. However, it was established 
                                                 
10 This time was selected in response to the availability of data. 
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that for the elimination of US sanction imposed on the EU to be definitive, this phase had to be 
fully implemented. 
It was not until 2006 that the EU import regime was substituted by a tariff-only import 
system. Under this regime, protected and non-preferred exporters are solely competing on the 
basis of tariff differences. Quotas on Latin American bananas were eliminated and are taxed at 
176 Euros per ton rate11. ACP imports are allowed duty free up to a quota level of 775.000 tons. 
Imports exciding this contingent must pay the non-preferred tariff level.  
Defining a tariff level was a long process for the EU and it involved two disputes brought 
to the WTO by Latin American providers. The initial requisite imposed by the WTO to the EU 
was that the tariff level had to ensure Latin American suppliers at least the same market access 
they had enjoyed under the previous import regime. In January 2005, the EU announced that 
after several months of consultation with ACP countries, they hade defined a tariff level of 230 
Euros per ton to imports from non-preferred suppliers. The ACP acquiesced to his tax believing 
it would let them compete against Latin American bananas. Considering this tariff level 
prohibitively high, a group of Latin American exporters requested arbitration with the WTO 
under the Doha Ministerial Decision.  The arbitration panel determined the proposed tariff did 
not grant Latin American suppliers the same market-access they had previously enjoyed.  
Afterwards, the EU proposed a lower tariff of 187 Euros per ton, which still did not 
please non-preferred suppliers. On this occasion, the EU requested a second arbitration to 
determine whether this new tax level was satisfactory. However, the report made by the WTO 
ruled out this tariff level under arguing that it still did not provide Latin American access to the 
EU banana market. Finally, the EU set a tariff of 176 Euros per ton to imports from this region. 
                                                 
11 Compared to a 75 Euros per ton tariff under the precious import regime. 
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Table 2-1 EU Banana Exporter Categories Prior to 1993 
 
Preferred suppliers Non preferred suppliers: 
African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACPs) 
countries 
EU overseas 
territories 
Latin American 
producers and 
others 
Non-traditional ACP 
Belize (a) Crete Brazil Belize (b)
Cameroon (a) Guadeloupe Colombia Cameroon (b)
Cape Verde Martinique Costa Rica Dominican Republic 
Dominica Madeira Ecuador Ghana 
Grenada The Canary Islands Guatemala Ivory Coast (b)
Ivory Coast (a)  Honduras Other ACP 
Jamaica  Mexico  
Madagascar  Nicaragua  
Saint Lucia  Panama  
Saint Vincent  Philippines  
Somalia  Others no identified  
Suriname    
Windward Islands    
Sources: Borrell, B. EU Bananarama III, 1994 and “Patiño, Maria I., M. Andrea. El régimen de acceso al 
mercado de la Unión Europea”. 
(a) Traditional quantities. 
(b) Above traditional preferred quantities. 
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Table 2-2 Summary of national import policies prior to the CMOB 
 
Group 1 (Wanted to  protect former colonies) 
Country Tariff Quota  Other restrictions  
France 20% 270,000 tons Closed to third countries 
exports but when exceptional 
conditions 
United Kingdom 20% 30,000 tons Licensed and allowed only 
when there existed a shortage 
in the favored supply. 
Italy 20% 270,000 None 
Portugal, Spain and 
Greece 
20% 0 Greece imposed a prohibitive 
tariff on imports from third 
countries.  
Group 2 (Wanted to protect ACP countries under the Lomé Convention) 
Country Tariff Quota  Other restrictions  
20% None None 
20% None None 
20% None None 
20% None None 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxemburg 20% None None 
Group 3 (Advocated for free trade) 
Country Tariff Quota  Other restrictions  
Germany No None None 
Austria (1) No None None 
Finland (1) No None None 
Sweden (1) No None None 
(1) This countries were not part of the EU when the CMOB came into effect. 
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Table 2-3 Overseas territories’ production subject to price compensation 
 
Overseas territory Maximum Production 
subject to compensation 
1991 production Excess (%) 
Canary Islands 420,000 339,450 23.73 
Guadeloupe 150,000 116,124 29.17 
Martinique 219,000 181,069 20.94 
Madeira 50,000 N.A N.A 
Crete 15,000 N.A N.A 
Total 854,000 636,643 24.00 
Source: “Patiño, Maria I., M. Andrea. El régimen de acceso al mercado de la Unión Europea”. 
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Table 2-4 Duty free import quantity limits for ACP suppliers and export levels in the period 1994-2000 
 
Actual imports (Tons) Country Duty free quota 
(Tons) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cote d’Ivoire (2) 155,000 - - 13,684 122,045 114,664 141,924 140,916
Cameroon  155,000   148,921 113,121 109,978 170,734 191,925
Suriname(2) 38,000 27,861 33,438 22,227 24,162 17,853 28,467 28,064 
Somalia (2) 60,000 - - 13,540 13,457 4,551 0 0 
Jamaica (2) 105,000 75,595 82,832 66,858 67,999 55,588 41,428 30,973 
Saint Lucia (2) 127,000 - - 79,877 52,602 56,861 53,579 47,692 
Saint Vincent/ 
Grenadine 
82,000 - -      
Dominica (2) 71,000 - - 27,260 27,053 22,543 22,755 18,058 
Belize (1) (2) 40,000 -  34,409 35,027 27,613 36,979 37,826 
Cape Verde  4,800        
Grenada  14,000 4,504 4,695 1,451 59 47 501 507 
Madagascar  5,900 - - - -    
Total 857,700 107,960 120,965 408,227 455,525 409,698 496,367 495,961
Source: CORBANA, 1993 and United Nations Statistics. 
(1) Remember that just part of Belize’s exports enjoys preferred treatment in the EU. 
(2) Exports estimated from banana imports reported by the EU. 
 
Table 2-5 Annual average exports of main Latin American banana suppliers to the EU 
(1980-1999) 
 
Country 
Total 
Exports 
Exports to 
the EU 
Share of 
imports to the 
EU 
Share into EU 
total imports 
Colombia 10,719.1 4,290.4 40.03 15.5 
Costa Rica 13,034.4 5,730.7 43.97 20.7 
Ecuador 17,567.3 3,931.9 22.38 14.2 
Guatemala 4,025.6 497.1 12.35 1.8 
Honduras 9,953.9 2,162.9 21.73 7.8 
Nicaragua 845.0 259.0 30.65 0.9 
Mexico 778.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 
Panama 7,766.8 4,701.2 60.53 17.0 
Dominican Republic 70.6 8.5 12.04 0.0 
Total Latin America 71,951.6 27,734.4 38.55 100.0 
(1) Hundred of tons. 
Source: United Nations. Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe. Tendencias y 
Perspectivas de las Exportaciones de Banano de América Latina y El Caribe. 1993 
 24
Table 2-6 Austria, Finland and Sweden average banana imports (1990-2000) 
 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria  144 154 150 146 144 111 96 94 88 102 93
Finland  70 73 86 96 169 66 58 60 58 64 62
Sweden  143 160 162 153 154 147 149 159 175 185 187
Total 357 387 398 395 466 324 303 313 321 351 341
Difference 
respect to quota 
-4 -34 -45 -42 -113 29 50 40 32 2 12
Hundred of tons. 
Source: FAO Statistics 
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Table 2-7 Human Development Index (HDI) of the EU banana suppliers 
 
Country Region Human development 
index 
Rank 
(1999) 
GDP per capita 
($US) 1
Dominica* ACP 0.873 - 3778 
Grenada * ACP 0.843 - 3295 
Saint Lucia * ACP 0.838 - 4505 
Saint Vincent and 
the Granadillas (a)  
ACP 0.836 - 3018 
Costa Rica LA 0.821 41 2942 
Mexico LA  0.790 51 5036 
Panama LA  0.784 52 3397 
Belize ACP  0.776 54 3045 
Colombia LA  0.765 62 2093 
Suriname ACP  0.758 64 1657 
Brazil LA  0.750 69 3525 
Philippines Others  0.749 70 1032 
Jamaica ACP  0.738 78 1487 
Ecuador LA 0.726 84 1109 
Cape Verde ACP 0.708 91 1400 
El Salvador LA 0.701 95 2007 
Nicaragua LA 0.635 106 459 
Honduras LA 0.634 107 856 
Guatemala LA 0.626 108 1637 
Madagascar ACP 0.462 135 239 
Ivory Coast ACP 0.426 144 808 
Source: Human Development Reports. 1999 
The HDI combines the real purchasing power per capita, life expectancy at birth, education in 
terms of adult literacy and school enrollment. 
*  The index was not reported for these countries in 1999. The value shown corresponds to 1994. 
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CHAPTER 3 -  Import demand for bananas in the European Union 
There has been some controversy regarding whether an inverse demand system would be 
more appropriate for analyzing the EU banana market than a quantity dependent demand system. 
Supporters of the inverse demand base their hypothesis on the fact that banana imports in the EU 
had historically been regulated by quotas on non-preferred suppliers. Therefore, quantities have 
been predetermined by the quota level and prices adjusted to them. A regular demand system 
assumes that quantities are determined based on the price level prevalent in the EU. 
Nevertheless, two arguments can be used to justify the use of a regular demand system to 
analyze the EU banana market. First, only imports from Latin America were limited by the 
established quotas in the EU banana market. Consequently, only imports from this region might 
be better explained by an inverse demand equation. Domestic and import demands from ACP are 
properly explained based on the assumption that quantities adjust to price changes. Second, the 
quota-tariff system has been substituted by a tariff-only import regime. This implies that inverse 
demand equations are no longer adequate descriptions of banana demand in the EU. Since one of 
the goals of this thesis is to provide policy makers with a well defined set of demand parameters 
to be used on subsequent welfare and market analysis, the relevant model, the one that best 
describes the most current market structure is a regular demand system.  
However, following the idea that at least the demand equation for Latin America should 
be inversely specified (prices adjusting to quantities), a regular and an inverse demand system 
are estimated. The first corresponds to the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) and the second to 
the inverse almost ideal demand system (IAIDS). The goal of estimating both models is to 
determine whether the parameter estimates obtained from both of them are consistent in terms of 
the way consumers in the EU consider bananas from different regions substitutes or 
complementary goods. 
The rest of this chapter is organized in three sections. The next one describes the 
theoretical aspects of both demand systems estimated. The other details the data used on the 
estimation and the last one presents and discusses the results obtained form the model estimation. 
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The Almost Ideal Demand System 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellabauer in 1980 
has been widely used to estimate systems of import demand equations. Two of its desirable 
characteristics are that it exactly satisfies the axioms of choice and allows testing for 
homogeneity and symmetry of the parameters (Deaton and Muellabauer). Those two conditions 
ensure the estimation of a theoretically justifiable import demand system. The system is derived 
from an indirect utility function, V(p,m), of the form shown in equation (1):  
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For the purpose of this study, i and j represent four different exporting regions. The first 
corresponds to Latin America, the main supplier of the EU. The second is composed of the 
countries from Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific that have traditionally enjoyed preferred access 
to the EU market. The third region comprises the communitarian countries, which are mainly 
overseas territories of Greece, Spain, France and Portugal. The last exporting region comprises 
the rest of the world thus i, j = 1, …, 4 and i ≠ j. p is a price vector containing import prices from 
each exporting region i; M is total expenditure in bananas in the EU, and 0α , iα , ijγ  and iβ are 
the parameters to be estimated. 
By solving equation (1) for M, the expenditure function can be recovered as shown in 
equation (4): 
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Where b(p) and a(p) correspond to the definitions previously given and U is utility level. 
By Shephard’s lemma, differentiating the log of this function with respect to the log of each 
price, a set of compensated share equations ( ) is obtained. These equations represent the share 
of each exporting region into total EU imports and are of the form shown in equation (5):  
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After solving equation 5 for U and substituting the solution back into the compensated 
share equation, uncompensated share equations are obtained: 
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By estimating three of these equations simultaneously (one must be dropped to avoid 
singularity of the variance-covariance matrix), a set of parameters specific for the EU banana 
market are derived. To be consistent with the general demand restrictions, adding up, 
homogeneity and symmetry were imposed on the system as shown in equations (7) to (9). 
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Price ( ijε ) and income ( imε ) elastiticies can be calculated by deriving the uncompensated 
share equations with respect to the appropriate variable as depicted in equations (10) and (11) 
respectively. 
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Where  ijδ  is the Kronecker delta, taking a value of 1 when i=j and zero otherwise. 
Compensated elasticities are derived from the above elasticities using the following relationship, 
derived from the Slutsky identity. 
iMjij
c
ij w ε−ε=ε          (12) 
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These elasticities are meaningful since they are a representation of the substitution 
relationships between exporting regions, allowing us to exactly determine whether imports from 
the different regions are either complements or substitutes. 
Data 
The complete data set consists of annual observations on per-capita quantity imported 
and import prices in the EU by exporting region for the period 1964 to 2004. These variables 
were constructed from trade flows, consumer price indices, and population statistics obtained 
from the following sources.  
Trade flows were obtained from the World Trade Annual Report of the United Nations. 
Statistics on commodity price indices (CPI) and population are from the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. Domestic prices for bananas in France, Italy and 
Greece are from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) web site. 
Original trade data included import flows for each EU country member and all their trade 
partners during the analyzed period. Imports by country were grouped according to their 
corresponding exporting region (i.e. Latin America, ACP, EU and rest of the world). Afterwards, 
nominal imported value for each EU country was deflated using the corresponding national 
consumer price index to obtain real imported values at 2004 US $. Next, quantity imported and 
import values from each region were aggregated along all communitarian countries to obtain 
total imports of the EU. Import prices were obtained as the ratio between 2004 real import values 
and their corresponding imported quantities. Total expenditure was calculated as the sum of 
import value from each exporting region. Each region’s share was obtained as the ratio between 
the corresponding real import value and total expenditure. Finally, per capita imports were 
calculated by dividing total quantity imported from each exporting region by total population. 
Some limitations of the data set are as follows. Because of the way trade data are 
reported, it was not possible to determine whether reported exports from EU countries 
corresponded to actual domestic production (Portugal, Spain, Greece and France) or to re-exports 
of bananas imported from other regions. As a result, import statistics from the EU might be over 
estimated. Additionally, new members added to the EU in 2004 were not included in the 
estimation due to limited data availability.  
 30
Descriptive statistics for the data are shown in Table 3.1.  Notice that Latin America is 
the main supplier of bananas to the EU. Per capita imports from this region averaged 4 kg a year 
during the period 1964 – 2004. However, imports from this region were the most variable, likely 
the result of the varied import regimes that have ruled the EU banana market during the analyzed 
period. Average per-capita imports from ACP and the EU are very similar. Nevertheless, exports 
from the ACP are more stable over time.  
Bananas from Latin America are the cheapest at the border (without accounting for 
tariffs) and prices from this region are less variable than import prices from other regions. 
Bananas from communitarian countries are the most expensive, followed by the ACP. Import 
prices from other suppliers are lower than from those two regions but still are not competitive 
with respect to Latin America. 
Results from the demand systems estimation  
Table 3.2 presents the parameter estimates obtained from the two AIDS models 
estimated. The first, and the one used for further analysis, includes the four exporting regions. 
The second one excludes rest of the world from the estimation. The objective of estimating this 
second model was to determine how sensitive elasticitites were to the inclusion of the ROW as a 
region because of its low share in the EU banana market. 
In the case of the four-region model, direct estimation yielded thirteen parameters while 
the other six were recovered from the theoretical restrictions imposed on the model. Eighteen out 
of nineteen coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% confidence level and the 
other at the 10%. Hence elasticitites, calculated as a function of the parameters, are likely quite 
robust.  
Demand elasticities obtained are shown in Table 3.3. They were calculated at each data 
point and then averaged over time to obtain a single parameter value. The numbers in 
parentheses are approximate t-values obtained by dividing the average elasticity by its 
corresponding standard deviation.  
The four own price elasticities have the expected negative sign and are significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. Import demand for bananas in the EU from all regions but 
the rest of the world (ROW) is relatively inelastic. Demand for domestic product is the least 
sensitive to own price changes (-0.23), followed by ACP (-0. 41) and Latin America (-0.97). On 
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the other hand, import demand from ROW is relatively elastic and therefore more sensitive to 
own price changes (-1.66). 
Expenditure elasticities indicate that bananas from the EU, ACP and Latin America are 
normal goods. However, demand for bananas from the EU and ACP vary proportionately less 
than expenditure changes. The opposite occurs to import demand from Latin America which is 
relatively more sensitive to expenditure changes. The coefficients for these three regions are 
significant at the 5% level. Contrary to this, income elasticity estimated for the rest of the world 
is negative and not significantly different from zero. This result will be discussed in more detail 
when the three-region model’s results are presented. 
Compensated price elasticities are also shown and used to determine whether bananas 
from the four different sources are complements or substitutes. The advantage of this procedure 
is that the income (expenditure) effect is eliminated, letting us analyze the pure price effect and 
categorize the goods as q-net complements or q-net substitutes. As expected, bananas from Latin 
American and the other regions are substitutes. Nevertheless only parameters for ACP and ROW 
are significant. Domestic and ACP bananas are also substitutes as expected but cross price 
elasticities for these two regions are not significantly different from zero. Results obtained for 
the ROW indicate that imports from this region are considered complementary to bananas 
supplied by ACP and the EU. Even though this result is only significant for the case of the ACP, 
it is worthwhile to expand on the reasons that may explain this result.  
While the objective is to estimate a demand system at the consumer level, the data used is 
at the wholesale level. It would be expected then that a fraction of total imports are for industrial 
or processing uses, which might deviate from the consumer demand relations found in the data. 
Additionally, the inclusion of ROW as a fourth region in the demand system might affect the 
results because of the low share it has in the EU banana market.  
This share has also decreased over time. For example, imports from this region accounted 
for 12% of the total imported value in 1964 by the EU but only 0.33% in 2004. On average, 
imports from this region accounted for just 2% of total banana imports in the EU during the 
analyzed period. This and the questionable elasticity values obtained for this region justified the 
estimation of another demand model excluding this region. 
Parameter estimates are presented in Table 3.2. A total of thirteen parameters were 
obtained in this case, eight of them directly from the model estimation and five more were 
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recovered from the theoretical restriction imposed on the model before its estimation. All 
parameters are significant.  
Conclusions drawn from own-price and expenditure elasticities are similar to those 
obtained from the four-region model. Demand for bananas from Latin America is the most price 
sensitive, followed by ACP and demand for communitarian bananas. Expenditure elasticities 
have the same signs and are very close in value. Indeed they are the same for Latin America and 
the EU. Compensated elasticities are not as robust as those obtained in the previous model. 
However, some conclusions are comparable to it. For example, bananas from Latin America and 
all other regions are substitutes and demands from the EU and ACP are complements. In this 
case the result is significant while in the previous model it was not.  
Because there are no evident gains in excluding ROW from the demand estimation, all 
subsequent analysis are based on the four-region model. Nevertheless it is important to keep in 
mind some of the limitations of the results, notably negative expenditure elasticity for ROW and 
some questionable complementary relations in the demand for bananas from different regions. 
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Table 3-1 Descriptive statistics of trade data used in demand estimation 
 
Variable Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Quantities (kg per capita)     
Latin America  4.07 2.59 0.87 8.46
EU 1.38 0.57 0.62 2.83
ACP 1.55 0.34 0.95 2.16
Others 0.16 0.22 0.01 0.71
Prices (real 2004 $/ton)     
Latin America  217.17 194.51 16.073 847.28
EU 279.14 222.53 18.012 802.89
ACP 261.81 213.72 12.314 776.33
Others 227.03 221.56 7.4721 862.38
Expenditure (real $ per capita) 2.24 2.51 0.06 9.66
The data set contains 42 observations. 
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Table 3-2 Parameters estimated from the AIDS model 
 
AIDS (4 regions) AIDS (3 regions) 
Parameter Coefficient Parameter Coefficient 
α0 96.66** α0 155.210*
 (96.57)  (2.673) 
α1 17.44** α1 27.280*
 (19.408)  (3.517) 
α2 -3.32** α2 -4.527*
 (-3.8925)  (-2.405) 
α3 -10.21** α3 -21.753*
 (-13.485)  (6.618) 
α4 -2.91** n/a n/a 
 (-4.321)   
β1 0.17** β1 0.167*
 (18.539)  (9.940) 
β2 -0.03** β2 -0.029*
 (-4.1714)  (-2.854) 
β3 -0.1** β3 -0.137*
 (-13.693)  (-11.067) 
β4 -0.04** n/a n/a 
 (-6.025)   
γ11 2.76** γ11 4.428*
 (9.023)  (-4.223) 
γ12 -0.57** γ12 -0.885*
 (-3.622)  (-2.847) 
γ13 -1.75** γ13 -3.543*
 (-9.2364)  (-4.090) 
γ14 -0.44** n/a n/a 
 (-3.2157)   
γ22 0.13** γ22 0.325*
 (1.8371)  (-2.847) 
γ23 0.34** γ23 0.560*
 (4.2922)  (2.438) 
Table continues… 
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Table continued… 
AIDS (4 regions) AIDS (3 regions) 
Parameter Coefficient Parameter Coefficient
γ24 0.1** n/a n/a 
 (-2.9189)   
γ33 1.14** γ33 2.982*
 (-7.244)  (3.900) 
γ34 0.27** n/a n/a 
 (-3.5116)   
γ44 0.07* n/a n/a 
 (-1.618)   
* Indicates significant values at the 5% level 
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Table 3-3 Elasticities from the 4-region AIDS model 
 
Uncompensated elasticities 
Price/Quantity 
Latin America EU ACP ROW 
Latin America -0.97** -0.40** 0.09 11.18 
 (-6.31) (-4.28) (0.50) (1.06) 
EU -0.32** -0.23* -0.10** -1.21 
 (-5.57) (-1.53) (-2.19) (-1.04) 
ACP -0.15* -0.18** -0.41** -4.00 
 (-1.63) (-3.40) (-2.00) (-1.01) 
Rest of the World 0.08** -0.05** -0.10** -1.66** 
 (2.68) (-4.09) (-3.142) (-2.51) 
     
Expenditure elasticity 1.36** 0.86** 0.52** -0.21 
 (18.06) (30.52) (4.04) (-0.88) 
Compensated elasticities 
Price/Quantity 
Latin America EU ACP ROW 
Latin America -0.31* 0.02 0.33** 8.98 
 (-1.48) (0.25) (2.03) (1.08) 
EU 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -2.26 
 (0.29) (-0.20) (0.392) (-0.94) 
ACP 0.19* 0.03 -0.27* -5.04 
 (1.41) (0.41) (-1.69) (-0.96) 
Rest of the World 0.11* -0.03 -0.09** -1.67** 
 (1.43) (-1.02) (-2.34) (-2.45) 
* Indicates significant at the 10% level 
** Indicates significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3-4 Elasticities from the 3-region AIDS model 
 
Uncompensated elasticities 
Price/Quantity 
Latin America EU ACP 
Latin America -1.081** -0.418** 0.519 
 (-2.514) (-2.871) (0.922) 
EU -0.323** -0.171 -0.178* 
 (-4.491) (-1.045) (-1.580) 
ACP 0.048 -0.286** -0.755* 
 (0.137) (-2.324) (-1.692) 
Expenditure elasticity 1.356* 0.875* 0.413* 
 (18.302) (34.890) (2.662) 
Compensated elasticities 
Price/Quantity 
Latin America EU ACP 
Latin America -0.391** 0.015 0.674** 
 (-4.006) (0.196) (11.646) 
EU 0.029** 0.027 -0.062* 
 (0.425) (0.641) (-1.3723) 
ACP 0.360** -0.061 -0.664** 
 (3.973) (-1.197) (-11.838) 
* Indicates significant at the 10% level 
** Indicates significant at the 5% level 
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CHAPTER 4 -  Economic effects of the new import policy 
Modeling of the import policy 
As explained in Chapter 2, prior to January 2006 the EU banana market was regulated by 
a tariff-quota system designed to protect EU communitarian and ACP producers. Under this 
scheme, imports from ACP countries enjoyed duty free access up to 750,000 tons. Above this 
quota, imports were taxed at a 380 Euros/ton rate (approximately US $373). Additionally, 
imports from non-preferred suppliers were subject to a tariff of 75 Euros/ton (approximately US 
$93) within a 2,750,000 ton quota.  Out-of-quota imports paid a tariff of 680 Euros/ton 
(approximately 2004 US $845). This quota was increased by 100,000 tons in 2002, as part of the 
second stage of an agreement signed between the EU and the US.  
To summarize Chapter 2, recall that the EU defined a new import system to replace the 
existing tariff-quota scheme. The new regime came into effect in January of 2006 and required 
the removal of all quotas but also a higher tariff level for non-preferred suppliers. The duty-free 
quota for ACP was increased to 775,000 tons in an attempt to continue to safeguard this region’s 
access to the EU market. However, ACP’s exports above this quota level must abide by the same 
regulations imposed on non-preferred suppliers.  
The effect of the transition from one import regime to another on the major banana 
suppliers of the EU is what is evaluated in the following two chapters. To model this transition it 
was necessary to convert the Latin American quota level to what I refer to as an “equivalent 
tariff” to avoid several complications related to the use of a non-continuous supply function as 
implied by a tariff-quota situation. The tariff-quota supply equation would be as shown in 
equation (13). 
[ ]iipiii quotapsMins ),,( τ=         (13) 
This specification indicates that export supply of region i (si) is given by the minimum 
quantity between the quota imposed on the specific region (quotai) and a quantity that depends 
on a export price (pip) and region-specific tariff level ( ). iτ
The obvious drawback of working with this supply specification is that it is not a 
continuous function, making it cumbersome to convert it to its total differential form. 
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Additionally, the modeling issue in the simulations would have required estimation of the 
elasticity of supply with respect to the quota; information that is not only unavailable, but 
questionable as to its meaning as well. Estimating an equivalent tariff allow one to subsume the 
quota component in the supply equation. Supply can then be solely expressed as a function of 
import prices and tariff levels.  
Using as a base case a pre-2006 producer surplus measure, one can calculate the tariff 
level that would have made Latin American producers as well off as the quota. This equivalent 
tariff was calculated as the difference between the actual price received by producers and a 
hypothetical price under which they would be willing to supply a quantity equal to the quota 
level, subject to achieving the same producer surplus as under the quota restriction.  
Figure 4.1 represents the pre-2006 market equilibrium for Latin America. Here, Q0 and Pc 
are the equilibrium quantity and price respectively. D is the demand curve faced by this region 
and the line PaAS represents the supply curve that would prevail under the import quota 
situation. Pa is the minimum price producers are willing to export to the EU market and A marks 
the minimum price at which producers are willing to export Q0 based upon the upward-sloping 
portion of the supply curve. 
 
Figure 4-1 Pre-2006 equilibrium in the Latin American banana market 
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Under this scenario, producer surplus is given by the shaded area under the equilibrium 
price (Pc) and above the supply curve. Geometrically for ease of estimation, this area can be 
divided in two parts, one given by the rectangle formed by points PbAEPc and the other by the 
triangle PaAPb.  Producer surplus can then be estimated as the sum of those two areas as shown 
in equations (14) and (15). 
( ) ( ) 00 **5.0* QPPQPPPS abbc −+−=       (14) 
 or        (15) ( 0*5.05.0 QPPPPS abc −−= )
 
Figure 4-2 Pre-2006 LAT simulated equilibrium under the absence of import quotas 
 
The calculated producer surplus was then used to simulate an equivalent new market 
equilibrium under a non-quota scenario, as the one depicted in Figure 4.2. The shaded area 
represents producer surplus and is equal to the producer surplus previously estimated under the 
quota scenario. What is needed is the hypothetical price (Pd) that would make producers as well 
off as under the quota while supplying quantity Q0. This price can be obtained from the producer 
surplus equation for the non-quota scenario (PS).  
0*)(*5.0 QPaPdPS −=         (16) 
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Since the values of producer surplus (PS), Pa and Q0 are known, Pd can be obtained by 
solving for Pd directly from equation (16). 
ad PQ
PSP +=
0
2          (17) 
And the equivalent tariff is determined as the difference between Pd and the actual price 
received by Latin American producers (Pc in Figure 4.1). 
Before presenting results of the previous simulation, let’s take a look at how prices Pa, Pb, 
and Pc are determined. Various choices for Pa could be used, including zero. Fortunately as long 
as the same Pa is used in the reference or base model and the counterfactual model, the choice of 
Pa is innocuous. For example, I chose to calculate Pa as an average price paid to producers plus a 
percentage added by exporters to cover transport and insurance costs12. However, because of the 
way the base and counterfactual producer surpluses were calculated, this variable cancels out. 
Therefore inclusion of an incorrect Pa into the calculations of the reference producer surplus, will 
have no effect on the hypothetical price estimated (Pd) for the non-quota scenario.13  
Pb is obtained from a Cobb Douglas supply equation of the form: 
α= APS           (18) 
Where S is quantity supplied and P and α are price and elasticity vectors respectively. 
This equation was calibrated for the constant term A trade data for the period 1999 to 2004 and 
elasticity values from existent literature as shown in (19).  
α= P
SA0           (19) 
Once the value of A0 was determined, it was possible to solve for the minimum price at 
which suppliers are willing to export the complete quota quantity during the years analyzed as 
indicated in equation (20).  
                                                 
12 This assumption is reasonable because multinational firms, which are mostly in charge of the export activity, buy 
a considerable proportion of their export supply from national producers. Therefore, prices paid for those bananas 
are good proxies of what can be consider the production cost of these firms’ export supply.  
 
13 Combining  equations (17) and (15), Pd can be expressed as: 
 ([ aabcd PPPPQQP +−−= 5.5.*
2
0
0
)] , which can be simplified to: 
bcd PPP −= 2  
 42
α⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0
0
A
QPb            (20) 
Where A0 is the calibrated constant term from equation (23) and Q0 is the quota level 
applied to Latin American countries in the period 1999 to 2004. Results of this calculation are 
presented in Table 4.1 for two alternative short-run elasticity values (0.75 and 1.5) based on the 
values reported by FAO (2005).  
Table 4.2 presents the equivalent per unit tariff for the previous two elasticity scenarios. 
Notice that as expected the more elastic the supply is, the less “penalized” Latin American 
producers are from the quota imposed on their exports to the EU banana market. These values 
were used for calibrating the equilibrium displacement model presented in the next section. 
Equilibrium displacement model 
To simulate the effects of the new EU import regime of bananas on the major producer 
regions, an equilibrium displacement model (EDM) was used. The EU banana market was 
decomposed, following the same criteria used for demand estimation, into four regions or 
markets defined by Latin America; the African, Caribbean, Pacific countries (ACP); the EU 
(representing local production) and rest of the world (ROW).  
The use of this model, instead of a partial equilibrium framework, takes into account not 
only the direct effects of the new import regime in the entire EU market but also the indirect 
effects from the interrelations among the different exporting regions. As shown by the cross 
price elasticities obtained from the AIDS model, the four exporting regions are related on the 
demand side.  
In this way, if the import price from a certain region changes as a result of the new import 
regime, not only that region’s quantities demanded and supplied will react, but also demand and 
supply from other regions. Ultimately, all import prices will react to those quantity variations, 
which will have an impact on the equilibrium prices and quantities of the other markets. This 
chain of events will continue until a new equilibrium has been simultaneously reached in all 
markets. The model that follows presents these interactions. 
The general model is initially described by the following set of equations: 
),,( iii zMdd
cp=    Demand for bananas from region i  (21) 
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),( i
p
iii pss τ=    Supply of bananas from region i  (22) 
ii sd =     Market clearing condition for quantities (23) 
i
p
i
c
i pp τ=−     Market clearing condition for prices  (24) 
Where i refers to each exporting region (i.e. Latin America, ACP, EU and others); M is 
total annual expenditure in bananas in the EU; represents a vector of n demand shifters for 
region i’s demand; is a vector of consumer prices; is producer price in region i; and, 
represents per-unit import tax for region i. Prices and quantities are endogenous in the model 
while shift variables, expenditure, and import tariffs were exogenously determined outside the 
model.  
iz
cp pip
iτ
The system is then converted to its log differential form following the steps described 
below. First, total differential of equations (21) to (24) were taken, which transformed the 
previous set of equations to a system of the form:  
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ii sd Δ=Δ           (27) 
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i pp τΔ=Δ−Δ          (28) 
where indicates absolute change (i.e. ) with upper indexes 1 and 0 
referring to after the shock and initial values of the variable respectively. Next, equations (25) to 
(28) were rearranged to express them in terms of elasticities and log differentials. Starting with 
expression (25), both sides of the equation were multiplied by 1/ to yield: 
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Then, the terms on the right hand side (RHS) were multiplied by 
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respectively to derive the following equation: 
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Finally, terms were combined together to express this equation in terms of elasticities and 
proportional changes as shown by (25’). 
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Where ijε  represents elasticity of demand i with respect to price j; iμ  is expenditure 
elasticity of demand i; inζ  is the elasticity of demand i with respect to variable zin; and  
symbolizes the proportional change of variable x (i.e. 
~
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A similar procedure was used to transform the three other equations of the system. For 
example, the supply equation was first multiplied by 1/  and then each resulting term of the 
RHS was multiplied by 
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Which after grouping and re-ordering of terms can be expressed as: 
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Where ijη  is the elasticity of supply i with respect to price j and iυ  is the elasticity of 
supply i with respect to its tariff.  
The following expression was derived from equation (23) after taking the total 
differential and multiplying each side by 1/ : iq
i
i
i
i
q
d
q
s Δ=Δ  
Making use of the fact that quantity demanded and supplied must change in the same 
proportion for the market to be in equilibrium, the following identity must hold: iii sdq == this 
equation (23) is equivalent to: 
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To convert the price clearing condition (24) into relative change form, each term of the 
original equation was multiplied by 
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Then, by multiplying both sides by p
ip
1 and re-arranging terms, equation (24) becomes: 
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Where iπ indicates the percentage tariff on imports from region i and is calculated as the 
ratio between per-unit tariff and producer price14.  
To summarize, the equilibrium displacement model of the EU banana market is described 
by the following set of equations: 
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The system was reduced by substituting equation (28’) into (26’) as follows: 
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By doing so, the model was solely expressed in terms of endogenous changes in 
quantities (supplied and demanded) and consumer prices ( ). Grouping these endogenous 
variables in the RHS and assuming that changes in all exogenous variables but the tariff level are 
zero
c
jp
15, the following system of three equations was obtained: 
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Equations (29) to (31) can be expressed in matrix form as M X = Y. Where M contains 
all relevant price elasticities, X embodies price and quantity changes and Y comprises 
information on exogenous variable changes. These matrices are defined as: 
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Specifically M, X and Y contain elements as follows. 
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The twelve equation system was solved for proportional consumer price and quantity 
changes as X =M-1 Y. Producer prices were recovered from identity (28’).  Those proportional 
changes were then used to calculate the welfare impact on the major producing regions from the 
new EU import regime for bananas. 
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Calibration of the equilibrium displacement model 
As shown by equations (29) to (31), supply and demand elasticities as well as policy 
variables were needed to calibrate the equilibrium displacement model. Demand parameters were 
obtained from the estimation of the Almost Ideal Demand System. Supply elasticities were taken 
from existent literature and corresponded to the same values used to calculate the equivalent 
tariff for Latin America.  
To model policy changes from one import regime to the other, it was assumed that only 
the quota imposed on Latin American imports was binding. This assumption is justified based on 
the quota realities (see Chapter 2). Since this quota was converted to its equivalent tariff, only 
data on tariff levels and tariff changes for all regions were required. The elasticity of supply with 
respect to the tariff level (υ) was approximated by the own price supply elasticity as an increase 
in the tariff level would have the same impact as a decrease in the prices paid to exporters. 
Finally, the percentage tariff (π) was calculated as the ratio between total tariff revenue received 
by the EU from each region and total value exported by the respective region. 
Results of the equilibrium displacement model 
Table 4.3 shows the results of the equilibrium displacement model for two different 
scenarios corresponding to the same elasticity values used in the equivalent tariff calculation. It 
is important to mention that the results discussed in this section are based on Monte Carlo 
simulations as will be explained in more detail in the following chapter. Briefly, the use of 
Monte Carlo analysis allows bounds to be placed on the calculated point estimates of price and 
quantity changes in each market in order to make probabilistic inferences about the possible 
changes in the EU banana market as a means of providing a sensitive analysis. 
Results indicate that under the new import regime, prices are likely to increase in all 
markets. In the first scenario, where Latin American supply is relatively inelastic (η = 0.75), 
there is an 88% chance that the import price for this region will increase. Price is also likely to 
rise in the rest of the world, ACP and the EU. However, the probability of communitarian 
producers obtaining a higher price is lower than for ROW and ACP suppliers whose probability 
of a price increase is around 61% and 63% respectively versus a 54% chance for EU producers.  
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Quantity exported by each region on the other hand is likely to be less affected by the 
import regime change. Again, Latin American exports have the greatest possibility of increasing 
(77% probability). The probability of imports from the EU growing is 54% and contrary to what 
happened to price increases, the chances of the ACP and ROW of augmenting their sales to the 
EU market are low respect to the EU. ACP producers face the lowest odds of increasing their 
export level with just a 7% chance whereas there is 31% probability that shipments from ROW 
increase in the short run.  
Finally, from the results it was also possible to determine the chances each region has of 
increasing their share in the EU banana market. As expected by the previous results, Latin 
American producers are the ones with the greatest opportunity for increasing their market share 
(74% probability), followed by the EU (24%), the ACP and ROW (with 15% and 14% 
respectively). 
Information on the new average price and quantities are also included in Table 4.3. These 
values are the average new price and quantity in each market and can be compared to their initial 
levels under the previous quota-tariff import regime.  
Notice that results are very stable across the two Latin American-supply scenarios. The 
chance of a price increase in both cases is the same while the probabilities of quantity increases 
are just slightly higher for the EU, ACP and ROW and lower for Latin America under the second 
scenario. The same happens to the possibility of each region increasing its market share. 
However, results still support the idea that Latin American producers are the most likely to 
increase their presence in the EU banana market. 
Table 4-1 Results of supply equation calibration 
 
LAT Export Supply Elasticity = 0.75 LAT Export Supply Elasticity = 1.50 
Period Import Price Quota level 
Estimated constant (A0)1 Pb2 Estimated constant (A0) Pb
1999 416.43 2,750,000 34225.39 346.72 371.27 379.98 
2000 361.61 2,750,000 38636.37 294.97 465.92 326.60 
2001 391.72 2,750,000 36202.08 321.71 411.15 354.99 
2002 436.38 2,750,000 35250.82 333.34 369.21 381.39 
2003 627.36 2,850,000 27121.63 495.87 216.36 557.76 
2004 820.96 2,850,000 22895.93 621.51 149.28 714.31 
Average3 509.08 2,783,333 32205.00 406.32 326.74 457.29 
(1) A0 corresponds to the constant term of the export supply curve of Latin America. 
(2) Pb represents the minimum price Latin American producers are willing to supply the quota level. 
(3) Aerage value was used to calculate the equivalent tariff under the two export supply elasticity scenarios. 
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Table 4-2 Latin American banana supply: equivalent tariff calculation 
 
LAT Export Supply Elasticity = 0.75 
Period Import price (pc)1 Pb2 Pa3 Producer surplus 4 Implicit price (pd)5 Equivalent tariff 
1999 416.43 346.72 310.61          241,352,300  486.14 69.71 
2000 361.61 294.97 302.89          172,376,276  428.25 66.64 
2001 391.72 321.71 292.73          232,356,968  461.72 70.01 
2002 436.38 333.34 302.27          326,074,811  539.41 103.04 
2003 627.36 495.87 296.45          658,914,924  758.84 131.48 
2004 820.96 621.51 317.58       1,001,540,150  1,020.42 199.45 
Average equivalent tariff 106.72 
LAT Export Supply Elasticity = 1.50 
Period Import price (pc) Pb Pa Producer surplus Implicit price (pd) Equivalent tariff 
1999 416.43 379.98 310.61 195,621,089 452.88 36.45 
2000 361.61 326.60 302.89 128,892,291 396.63 35.02 
2001 391.72 354.99 292.73 186,595,251 428.44 36.72 
2002 436.38 381.39 302.27 259,998,783 491.36 54.98 
2003 627.36 557.76 296.45 570,734,215 696.96 69.60 
2004 820.96 714.31 317.58 869,301,901 927.62 106.65 
Average equivalent tariff 56.57 
(1) Actual import price in constant 2004 US $. 
(2) Minimum price Latin American producers are willing to supply the quota level (from Table 4.1). 
(3) Vertical intercept of Latin America export supply curve. 
(4)  In constant 2004 US $.  
(5) Simulated price that would make producers as well of as the quota. 
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Table 4-3 New equilibrium and relative changes in import price and quantity by region 
 
 Scenario 1 (η = 0.75)  Scenario 5 (η = 1.50) 
Probability of:1 Latin  
America 
EU ACP ROW Latin  
America 
EU ACP ROW 
Price increase 0.88 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.83 0.53 0.59 0.60 
Quantity increase 0.77 0.54 0.07 0.31 0.83 0.53 0.07 0.33 
Market share increase 0.78 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.79 0.22 0.15 0.13 
Average changes in:         
Share 0.09 -0.13 -0.25 -0.17 0.10 -0.14 -0.25 -0.18 
Quantity 0.09 -0.08 -0.27 0.02 0.15 -0.09 -0.27 0.03 
Price 0.18 -0.20 0.39 0.08 0.14 -0.22 0.39 0.08 
Average new:  
Share 0.73 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.74 0.14 0.12 0.00 
Quantity 3,688,923 799,935 587,873 8,184 3,900,313 794,574 587,538 8,212 
Price 838 550 988 1017 810 539 988 1019 
Initial:      
Share 0.69 0.15 0.14 0.02     
Quantity 3,399,798 870,014 805,945 7,985 3,399,798 870,014 805,945 7,985 
Price 709 688 709 941 
 
709 688 709 941 
(1) Probability of decrease can be obtained as 1 minus the probability of increase reported here.  
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CHAPTER 5 - Welfare analysis of the import-only regime 
As has been previously stressed, the goal of this study is to determine the effect of the 
new import regime on banana producers. Although consumer welfare is also important, banana 
producers are more vulnerable to market changes. Whereas expenditure on bananas does not 
represent a significant share of a consumer’s total expenditure, for producers, a small decrease in 
their market share might imply important losses and may even force them out of the market. 
Therefore, this section focuses on the estimation of the economic impact of the new import 
policy on banana producers from all regions but mainly those on Latin America and the ACP. 
Welfare changes are measured as the change in producer surplus as detailed in the following 
section. 
Producer surplus 
Because each region’s market equilibrium not only depends on own price but also on the 
price of bananas from the competing regions, a price change in one region would affect demand 
and supply in each market. The EU market and that of its suppliers is depicted in Figure 5.1 Even 
though prior to 2006, the Latin American market behaved differently than the other three regions 
due to the existence of a binding quota, the calculation of the equivalent tariff explained in the 
previous section, enabled to analyze all four markets under the same scheme. 
In the diagram, S0 and D0 represent the initial supply and demand curves respectively 
(here, we have used linear curves for simple explanation). Initial market equilibrium is given by 
price level p0 and quantity q0. Due to the enforcement of a new import policy, supply and 
demand changes can be expected in all regions. Demand changes will be determined mostly by 
the substitution or complementary relationship between the bananas from different origins. For 
example, as demand for ACP and Latin America are substitutes, an increase in the price of Latin 
American bananas will increase the demand for ACP produce. Changes in the supply will be 
determined by how sensitive the supply from each region is to its own price changes. 
Figure 5-1 Equilibrium of major supplier regions in the EU banana market 
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The new equilibrium will be given at a new point such as f, with p1 and q1 being the new 
price and quantity levels. Whether these variables are higher or lower than their initial values can 
not be determined a priori. The place of the new equilibrium depends on the combined effect of 
the supply and demand curve movements, which ultimately depends on the cross-price demand 
and own-price supply elasticities in each region.  
For expositional purposes a hypothetical scenario is depicted where initial producer 
surplus is given by the triangle p0bI0 and then changes to p1fI1 due to the new import regime. The 
difference between those two areas is a measure of the change in producer surplus ( ), which 
can be expressed as: 
iPSΔ
1100 fIpbIpPSi −=Δ          (32) 
Defining g as the shift in the supply equation and assuming that supply and demand shifts 
are parallel, the triangle ghI1 is equivalent to p0bI0. So, changes in producer surplus for each 
region can be expressed as: 
111 fIpghIPSi −=Δ          (33) 
This difference is equal to the area ghfp1, which can be decomposed into two smaller 
areas: the rectangle gmfp1 and the triangle mfh. Those areas can be calculated respectively as: 
111 )qp-(gdmfp =                    (34-a) 
)q-)(qp-0.5(gmfh 011=                   (34-b) 
Therefore, the change in producer surplus for each region i ( iPSΔ ) is given by: 
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Where gi is the shift of region i’s supply,  and  are initial and new equilibrium prices 
in region i respectively and  and  are initial and new equilibrium quantities.  
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In share form (35) can be expressed as: 
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1
ii qw5.0qw ΔΔ+Δ=Δ iPS         (36) 
Where  and represent changes in region i’s share and in quantity supplied, 
respectively.  
iwΔ iqΔ
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Multiplying the first and second terms of the RHS of equation (44) by 
i
i
w
w
and 
i
i
i
i
s
s
w
w
respectively, the change in producer surplus can be expressed in terms of relative changes 
as shown by (37). 
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 Total change in producer surplus for the EU market is given by the sum of the changes in 
producer surplus in each region: 
∑
=
Δ=Δ
4
1i
iEU PSPS          (38) 
Precision Measures of the Welfare Estimates 
As discussed earlier, the equilibrium displacement model that solves for the parameters 
necessary to calculate welfare effects of the new import regime was parameterized based, on 
among other variables, demand elasticities of the EU market. These elasticities were calculated 
as non-linear functions of parameters estimated from the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). 
Therefore, for each different set of parameters there exist a new set of elasticities that differ from 
the others depending on the magnitude of the difference among the parameter sets and the way 
those parameters are related within each set. Likewise, there is a solution for the EDM model and 
new welfare estimations for each parameter set. Making use of these relationships, Monte Carlo 
simulations based on the demand parameters obtained from the AIDS model were used to derive 
measures of precision for the producer surplus estimates.  
To do this, I started with the fact that each parameter obtained from the AIDS model is 
characterized by its point estimate and its standard deviation. Additionally, the complete 
parameter set is also described by a variance-covariance matrix that depicts the degree of 
correlation between each parameter. Ignoring this correlation between coefficients would not 
generate samples with exactly the same characteristic as the original multiple-variable population 
(Fan et al. 2002).  
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Assuming normality of all parameters, imposing the population correlation pattern on a 
sample data set was done by decomposing the covariance matrix using the procedure proposed 
by Fan et .al (2002). First, to define the structure of the relationship between the demand 
parameters in a way that could be imposed on the sample data, the variance-covariance matrix 
generated when solving the AIDS model was decomposed using the principal component factor 
extraction method. In general, this procedure generates new variables, also known as factors that 
are linear combinations of the variables analyzed.  
In this case, decomposition of the AIDS parameter variance-covariance matrix generated 
a new pattern matrix of dimension 13 X 13 because the procedure was performed on the 13 
coefficients directly generated by the demand model. The information generated here was used 
to simulate coefficient values of the other six parameters that were not directly estimated by the 
AIDS model but that were recovered from the economic restrictions imposed before the demand 
system instead. The SAS code for this step is provided in Appendix B. 
In a second step, k random variables were generated and then multiplied by the factor 
pattern matrix to impose the population correlation and generate a sample of correlated variables 
of size k. Finally, using data on parameters means and standard deviations in a Monte Carlo 
framework, a distribution of demand parameters was generated, which enabled me to build 
distributions of elasticities and hence, distributions of the solutions to the EDM and, thus, of 
producer surplus.  
To ensure the analysis is based on reliable coefficients, once the parameter distribution 
was obtained, elasticities were calculated at each data point and then tested to ensure that each 
elasticity set conformed to economic theory. In other words, each elasticity set was tested for 
negativity (negative own price elasticities) and curvature16 (negative semi-definite Hessian of 
compensated elasticities). If any given parameter set did not conform to any of these two 
restrictions, the data point was eliminated. The goal is to obtain what is termed “truncated 
distribution” of elasticities in order to perform the requisite simulations. Even with the faster 
computer, the simulations are nonetheless very time consuming. When the process was 
terminated, I had obtained a truncated distribution with 267 observations that was compliant with 
all theoretical economic restrictions. Descriptive statistics of this parameter distribution and 
estimated market shares are shown in Table 5.1.  
                                                 
16 Adding up, homogeneity and symmetry were imposed when calculating the AIDS model. 
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Notice that on average the parameter values of the truncated distribution are almost the 
same as the point estimates of the original data set obtained from the AIDS model. However, the 
truncated distribution presents lower variability, measured as the standard deviation of the 
parameters. This was a result of imposing restrictions on the parameters, which eliminated 
extreme data points that did not conform to economic theory. Average market shares simulated 
at each data point for the four regions are also very close to their real values in 2003, the base 
year used in the calculations. 
Results 
Table 5.2 shows producer surplus changes that result from the EU switching to a new 
import regime under two alternative supply elasticity values. It also includes information on 
price, quantity and share changes (solution of the EDM) as well as the new equilibrium levels of 
those variables for each producing region.  
The difference between the two scenarios is the value of Latin American supply 
elasticity, which in the first case is less elastic simulating a shorter time horizon (η = 0.75). The 
second scenario models a more elastic supply for Latin America and can be viewed as a larger 
time horizon where producers had more flexibility in responding to market changes by adjusting 
their production levels and changing their marketing practices.  For both scenarios, own price 
supply elasticities for the other regions are 0.4 in the case of the European Union, 0.5 for ACP’s 
and 0.8 for the rest of the world (ROW). These values are based on the estimates by Arias 
(2006).  
From the first scenario, based on the average changes in producer surplus, it can be 
concluded that Latin American and EU producers gain from the new import regime, while ACP 
suppliers are harmed and exporters from the rest of the world are not affected. However, 
additional information generated from the parameter distribution, instead of just point estimates, 
indicates that these results are not certain. 
For example, even though mean changes in producer surplus for Latin America and the 
EU are positive, the probability of producers from Latin America gaining from the new regime is 
79%. This means that there is a 21% chance that producers from this region might be harmed by 
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the tariff-only import regime. This is also evident when considering the 90% confidence interval 
of the producer surplus for Latin America, which ranges between -$368,247 and $816,005. 17
What is perhaps more interesting is that such high variability might be an indication that 
the tariff-only import regime is statistically no different from the import policy enforced by the 
Common Market Organization for bananas (CMOB). If this were the case, one could conclude 
that EU has been successful in adopting an alternative import system that is consistent with 
WTO regulations and at the same time maintains Latin American access to its market, at least in 
the short run.  
A similar analysis can be done for the EU. Simulation results indicate that producers 
from this region gained an average of $57,868 as result of the new import regime. However, the 
chance of producers being positively affected is only 28%. In other words, there is a probability 
of 78% that suppliers from this region lose due to the import regime change. Changes in 
producer surplus for this region vary between -$34,595 and $400,326, thus, again, one might 
conclude that the new regime leads to no change, at least not a statistically significant one.  
Additionally, even though it seems that producers from the ACP region are the net losers 
from an import system change, statistics of the estimated producer surplus changes indicate that 
this measure is not significantly different from zero. That is, on average producers from this 
region are not really harmed by the new import system. The same result was obtained for the rest 
of the world, where point estimates indicate that producers from this region gained $1 from the 
import system switch. It can be concluded therefore that the tariff-only and the CMOB import 
regimes are equivalent from the perspective of these two regions.  
When analyzing price and quantity changes, all regions face the possibility of obtaining a 
higher price for their product, with Latin America having the better odds of increasing their 
equilibrium price, followed by the rest of the world, ACP and the EU in that order. Results are 
not as promising for quantity increases. For example, the probability for Latin American and EU 
producers of increasing their quantity supplied is 77% and 54% respectively. Meanwhile, the rest 
of the world faces a probability of 31% of increasing their quantity exported to the EU while this 
possibility is just 7% for the ACP region.  
These results comply with the ones obtained from analyzing producer surplus changes. 
Latin America has the greatest possibility of increasing its market share in the EU banana market 
                                                 
17 Surplus is measured in constant 2004 US $. 
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(78%), followed by the EU (24%), ACP (15%) and the ROW (14%). 18 However, there is not 
certainty that any region will gain or lose from the new import regime.  
For the second scenario, average gains are higher for Latin America, the EU and the 
ROW and average losses are lower for the ACP. If we maintain the assumption that this scenario 
models a larger time horizon (in the form of a more elastic supply for the EU), results fit the idea 
that producers are less affected because they had more time to adjust to the new market 
conditions in the EU banana market.  
Even though Latin America still gains on average, producer surplus changes are lower 
under this scenario. Additionally, changes in the producer surplus for the other regions are not 
significantly different from zero. Probabilities of gaining from the switch to a tariff-only import 
system are about the same for Latin America and the EU but a little bit more promising for ACP 
and ROW suppliers.   
Tables 5.3 to 5.5 show different scenarios maintaining the same supply elasticities used 
for scenarios 1 and 2, but varying the tariff level imposed by the EU. Three alternative tariff 
levels were analyzed. The first corresponds to the initial tariff proposed by the EU of 230 
Euros/ton and that was ruled out by a WTO panel. The second is the lower tariff suggested by 
the EU after the WTO resolution (176 Euros/ton) and the third corresponds to the tariff level 
requested by the Latin American region at the beginning of the consultation process with the 
WTO (75 Euros/ton).  
Contrary to what one might think, a higher tariff does not harm Latin American 
producers as much as it does ACP suppliers. This is most evident from scenario 3, in which a 
higher tariff level (230 Euros/ton) implies a higher average producer surplus for Latin America 
and higher average losses for the ACP region compared to the base scenario. This indicates that 
the duty free quota conceded to producers from this region is in fact binding and that their ability 
of overcoming the effects of an import tariff is limited. This result is not surprising as this has 
been the argument used by ACP producers and EU policy makers to protect this region against 
competition from lower cost Latin American producers.  
                                                 
18 The higher possibility of the ACP gaining market share with respect to the ROW derives from the higher average 
change in price that the first region might face. 
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The better gains for Latin America derive from a greater quantity increase. Under the 230 
Euros/ton tariff scenario the new average quantity would have been around 200 thousand tons 
higher than under the base scenario. ACP exported quantity is on the other hand lower. 
As happened in the previous cases however, there is no certainty that Latin America 
would have benefited from the adoption by the EU of such a tariff level and again, even though 
changes in producer surplus for ACP are negative on average, there is no statistical evidence that 
those changes are different from zero. That is, one cannot conclude that ACP producers would 
have been made worse off if the EU had set its tariff level at this level.  
Results from scenario 4 are qualitatively equal to the previous one. The difference is in 
the magnitude of the welfare effects, especially for Latin America and the ACP.  Here, a lower 
tariff translates into lower average losses for the ACP and lower average gains for Latin 
America. Results suggest correlation between the magnitudes of gains for Latin America and 
losses for the ACP region. This idea is sustained by results from the last scenario, which 
analyzed the effects of imposing a tariff of just 75 Euros/ton. Under such market conditions, 
ACP average welfare reduction and Latin American gains would have been the lowest of all 
possible scenarios.  
Interestingly, conclusions drawn from simulations under alternative tariff levels are 
opposite to the ideas expressed by most exporters and EU policy makers when trying to negotiate 
the tariff level. That is, it has been shown here that the lower the tariff the less benefited Latin 
America producers would have been because it would have enabled ACP producers to compete 
under more favorable conditions against Latin American exports. 
Final remarks 
Even though it is still early for exporters to determine whether they will be harmed or 
helped by the import regime, as it has only been in effect for less than a year, some Latin 
American countries such as Costa Rica and Panama have admitted that their exports have not 
decreased as a result of the new import policy. This position is in contrast with that maintained 
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by other exporting countries, especially Ecuador, who argues that the 176 Euros/ton tariff level is 
prohibitive.19  
As discussed, results from the simulation analysis show that a null hypothesis of no 
change for producers from the new import policy cannot be rejected. However, this does not 
mean that the tariff-only import system will affect all countries in the same way. This is 
especially true when considering the differences in production costs prevalent among producer 
countries within a region. As Chacon (2004) showed in an analysis of the effect of the first stage 
of the US-EU agreement in the main Latin American producers, even though the quota level for 
these countries increased, only Costa Rican and Colombian producers benefited from it. Ecuador 
and the rest of the producers from this region were made worse off by the new import policy 
scheme.  
This situation might be repeated again and results from the analysis are consistent with 
such a prognosis. For example, it is not certain that Latin America will gain from the new import 
regime. The possible losses reported by the simulation exercises might correspond to losses 
faced by countries such as Ecuador. Additionally, the fact that the simulations suggest the 
possibility that the old and new import regimes are equivalent, is in line with Costa Rica and 
Panama confessing that during the present year their exports to the EU have not importantly 
changed as a result of the import regime changing.  
Finally, results are in line with some conclusions reached by other authors. Guyomard 
(2004) for example indicated that ACP producers are the most vulnerable to the new import 
regime and that they will be negatively affected unless they are compensated and their banana 
production becomes more competitive. This situation is likewise reflected in our results. 
Anania (2006) concluded that the 176 Euros/ton tariff is not high enough to maintain 
Latin American access to the EU banana market. She showed that the new import regime 
benefits non-preferred suppliers. Our results show that on average and in probabilistic terms this 
a plausible outcome of the EU switching regimes. 
                                                 
19 Ecuador proposed for Latin American producers to call another WTO panel to ask for a reduction of the 176 
Euros/ton tariff to their bananas. Costa Rica did not support this position as they support a gradual decrease of the 
quota to avoid an overflow of the market. (La Nación. August 15 and October 20, 2006) 
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Table 5-1 Comparison of simulated distribution and descriptive statistics of the demand 
parameter set 
 
Simulated distribution N=267 Point Estimates from AIDS 
Parameter Mean St. Deviation Parameter Mean St. Deviation
α1 17.44 0.66 α1 17.42 0.90 
γ12 -0.57 0.18 γ12 -0.58 0.16 
γ13 -1.75 0.18 γ13 -1.73 0.19 
γ14 -0.44 0.14 γ14 -0.43 0.13 
β1 0.17 0.01 β1 0.17 0.01 
α0 96.66 0.99 α0 96.58 1.00 
α2 -3.32 0.57 α2 -3.28 0.84 
α3 -10.21 0.42 α3 -10.18 0.75 
γ23 0.34 0.08 γ23 0.34 0.08 
γ24 0.10 0.03 γ24 0.10 0.03 
γ34 0.27 0.07 γ34 0.27 0.08 
β2 -0.03 0.01 β2 -0.03 0.01 
β3 -0.10 0.00 β3 -0.10 0.01 
Simulated market shares 2003 market shares 
Region Average St. Deviation Region Average St. Deviation 
Latin America 0.66 0.12 Latin America 0.69 n/a 
EU 0.15 0.08 EU 0.15 n/a 
ACP 0.15 0.09 ACP 0.14 n/a 
ROW 0.03 0.02 
 
ROW 0.02 n/a 
Table 5-2 Welfare and market effects of the tariff-only import regime 
 
Scenario 1 (η = 0.75) Scenario 2 (η = 1.50) 
Variable 
Lat EU ACP ROW Lat EU ACP ROW 
Mean change in producer 
surplus (1)
816,005 57,868 -3,611,442 1 391,305 19,407 -520,812 17
90% confidence interval            
Min -368,247 -34,595 -23,568 -4 -328,089 -35,394 -23,786 -4
Max 1,326,103 401,326 222,083 5 1,265,397 303,252 334,425 6
Probability of increase in:         
Producer surplus 0.79 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.78 0.28 0.18 0.16
Price 0.88 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.88 0.54 0.61 0.61
Quantity 0.77 0.54 0.07 0.31 0.75 0.54 0.08 0.30
Market share 0.78 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.77 0.25 0.16 0.15
Average new:         
Share 0.73 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.72 0.15 0.13 0.00
Quantity 3,688,923 799,935 587,873 8,184 3,879,885 865,463 486,967 7,935
Price 838 550 988 1017 
 
828 679 819 966
(1) Measured n 2004 US$. 
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Table 5-3 Welfare and market effects of three alternative tariff levels in the EU banana market 
 
Scenario 3 (τ = 230 Euros/ton) Scenario 4 (τ = 187 Euros/ton) Scenario 5 (τ = 75 Euros/ton) Variable 
Lat EU ACP ROW Lat EU ACP ROW Lat EU ACP ROW 
Mean change in producer 
surplus 
823,844 57,236 -3,679,865 1 731,943* 64,678 -3,015,875 2 391,305* 19,407 -520,812 17 
90% confidence interval             
Min -358,406 -34,634 -23,581 -4 -303,605 -34,531 -23,535 -4 -328,089 -35,394 -23,786 -4 
Max 1,318,597 396,765 225,856 5 1,252,070 379,093 193,657 5 1,265,397 303,252 334,425 6 
Probability of increase in:             
Producer surplus 0.79 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.79 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.78 0.28 0.18 0.16 
Price 0.87 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.91 0.55 0.62 0.66 0.88 0.54 0.61 0.61 
Quantity 0.79 0.54 0.07 0.32 0.54 0.55 0.07 0.28 0.75 0.54 0.08 0.30 
Market share 0.78 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.78 0.27 0.15 0.16 0.77 0.25 0.16 0.15 
Average new:             
Share 0.73 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.72 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.72 0.15 0.13 0.00 
Quantity 3,731,984 798,843 587,805 8,190 3,293,545 809,961 588,500 8,132 3,879,885 865,463 486,967 7,935 
Price 832 547 988 1,018 889 569 990 1,014 828 679 819 966 
CHAPTER 6 - Summary and conclusions 
The EU is one of the world’s biggest importers of bananas and, as such import policies 
enforced by this trade union are likely to have a great impact on the major producers of bananas. 
Aiming to protect communitarian producers and exporters from selected ex-colonies of Africa, 
the Caribbean and Pacific and to honor previous agreements, the EU unified its import policy for 
bananas in 1993. This policy, known as the Common Market Organization for Bananas, 
generated one of the most controversial trade disputes in history. After several modifications of 
the original regime, in January 2006, the EU changed its import regime to satisfy a World Trade 
Organization mandate and to honor an agreement signed with the United States in 2000. 
The controversy generated during and after the enforcement of both import regimes has 
inspired authors to analyze this market extensively. However, there are still many gaps to fill in 
the literature that are addressed in this study, especially the lack of adequate estimation of 
demand parameters and of statistical simulation analysis to test for the significance of the results 
obtained from the analysis.  
The objectives of this project were to provide a detailed overview of the history of the 
trade dispute, to estimate a theoretically consistent demand system to generate reliable 
parameters and then to use these parameters in a system-wide welfare analysis of the EU banana 
market. The latter focused on the impact of the new import policy in the major producing areas 
as these are the agents that are most likely to be affected by the new import regime.  
Additionally, Monte Carlo analysis was used to derive sensitivity measures of the welfare and 
market change estimates.  
Analysis of results indicates that on average Latin American and EU communitarian 
producers benefit from the new regime while ACP exporters will be harmed. However, the 
sensitivity analysis, which allowed making probabilistic inferences about the statistical 
significance of these point estimates, indicates that those results are not certain. The hypothesis 
that the new import regime will not affect the major suppliers of the EU banana market was not 
rejected. This might indicate that the policy enforced by the Common Market Organization for 
Bananas and the current tariff-only import regime are statistically equivalent. In other words, the 
EU expertly forced a tariff level that will leave much as status quo.  
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Another interesting result is that the duty –free quota allowed to ACP producers is not 
enough to safeguard the market interests of this region. A higher tariff level, such as that initially 
proposed by the EU, will no better protect ACP exporters from Latin American competition. 
Indeed, higher import taxes benefit the through market share losses of the ACP region in the EU 
banana market. 
Based on opinions recently expressed by some Latin American countries regarding their 
support of the new import regime and on conclusions drawn from the simulation analysis, it 
seems likely that not all countries will be affected in the same way by the change in import 
regimes. It would be important for future analysis to determine country-specific effects of the 
new import regime. This can be achieved by estimating a demand system disaggregated by 
country to generate country-specific demand elasticitites. This would enable solving a modified 
equilibrium displacement model where markets are defined as individual countries and not as 
regions as was done here. Finally, results of the equilibrium displacement model indicate that EU 
consumers are likely to lose from the new regime due to higher prices and lower quantities. So, 
future research should also address this issue. 
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Appendix A - Variable definition and description 
Table A-7-1 Observed variables in Chapter 3 (EU import demand for bananas) 
 
Variable Name Description Unit / base year Source  
i, j Producing regions Latin America (Lat) 
European Union (EU) 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) 
Rest of the world (ROW) 
N/A N/A 
p Price vector Annual price vector containing annual import 
prices from each exporting region i 
2004 US $ per ton Computed as the ratio 
between real import 
value and quantity 
imported from each 
region i. 
M Expenditure Annual total expenditure in bananas in the EU 2004 US $  Computed as the sum of 
import value from each 
region 
Table continues… 
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 Table continued… 
Variable Name Description Unit / base year Source  
iw  Uncompensated share 
equation 
Share equation for each region i estimated based on 
observed shares, total expenditure M, price vector 
p and estimated coefficients.  
Percentage Observed shared 
computed as the ratio 
between region’s i  
imported value and total 
expenditure M. 
ijε  Uncompensated own 
price and cross price 
elasticities 
Measure of the sensibility of demand of bananas 
from region i to price changes of bananas from 
region j 
Percentage Computed from the 
AIDS model parameter 
estimates 
imε  Expenditure elasticity Measure of the sensibility of demand of bananas 
from region i to changes in total expenditure M 
Percentage Computed from the 
AIDS model parameter 
estimates 
c
ijε  Compensated own 
price and cross price 
elasticities 
Measure of the sensibility of demand of bananas 
from region i to price changes of bananas from 
region j isolated of the income effect. 
Percentage Computed from 
observed shares, 
uncompensated price 
and income elasticities 
q  Quantity vector Vector containing imported quantity from each 
region i. 
Tons / year World Trade Annual 
Report of the United 
Nations.  
ijf  Flexibility Measure of the sensibility of region i’s import price 
from to imported quantity changes from region j. 
Percentage Computed from the 
IAIDS model parameter 
estimates. 
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Table A-7-2 Theoretical variables in Chapter 3 (EU import demand for bananas) 
 
Variable Name Description 
V(p,M) Indirect utility 
function 
Indicates the maximum utility level that EU consumers can achieved from consuming 
bananas when spending M dollars given prices p. 
E(p,u) Expenditure function Represent the minimum expenditure necessary to achieve utility level U given the price 
vector p 
c
iw   Compensated share 
equation 
Share equation obtained from the expenditure function using Shepard’s lemma. (Holds 
utility level constant) 
U Direct utility  
function 
Consumer’ s utility derived from the consumption of bananas from all regions 
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Table A-7-3 Variables used in Chapter 4 (Equilibrium Displacement Model)  
 
Variable Name Description Unit / base year Source  
di EU demand for 
bananas from each 
region i 
Accounts for the quantity imported by the EU 
from each region i. 
Tons / year World Trade 
Annual Report of 
the United Nations.  
iτ  Per unit tariff for 
region i 
Import tax paid by each region i to enter the 
EU market. 
Euros / ton 
2004 US $ / ton 
Various 
pp  Vector of producer or 
exporter prices 
Prices of bananas from region i at the exporter 
level. 
2004 US $ per ton Computed as the 
ratio between real 
import value and 
quantity imported 
from each region i. 
cp  Vector of consumer 
prices  
Prices of bananas from region i at the 
consumer level. 
2004 US $ per ton Computed as 
producer price plus 
per unit tariff . iτ
iz  Vector of n demand 
shifters for demand 
from region i 
Takes into account variables other then prices 
and expenditure that have an affect on EU the 
import demand of bananas.  
AIDS model no shifters 
Annual 
 
 
N/A 
Table continues… 
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 Table continued… 
Variable Name Description Unit / base year Source  
ixΔ  Total differential of a 
given variable xi  
Indicates absolute changes in the equilibrium 
value of the variables that define the EU 
banana market model (i.e. quantities, prices 
and policy variables).  
 01
iii xxx −=Δ  
~
ix  
Proportional change in 
variable xi
Change in variable xi expressed in relative 
terms.  
Percentage 
0
01
i
ii
x
xx −
 
ijε  Elasticity of demand i 
with respect to changes 
in price j 
Measure of the sensibility of demand of 
bananas from region i to price changes of 
bananas from region j 
Percentage From the AIDS and 
GAIDS models. 
iμ  Expenditure elasticity 
of demand for region i 
Measure of the sensibility of demand of 
bananas from region i to changes in total 
expenditure M 
Percentage From the AIDS 
model. 
 
 
 
inζ  
Elasticity of demand i 
with respect to a 
change in variable zin.
Measure of the sensibility of demand of 
bananas from region i to changes in shifter 
variable zin. 
Percentage From the GAIDS 
model. 
Table continues… 
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 Table continued… 
Variable Name Description Unit / base year Source  
ijη  Elasticity of supply i 
with respect to price j 
Measure of the sensibility of region i’s export 
supply to changes in region j;s export price.  
Percentage B. Borrell and 
Hanslow K. 
iυ  Elasticity of supply i 
with respect to its tariff 
Measure of the sensibility of region i’s export 
supply to changes in its own import quota .  iτ
Percentage  
iπ  Percentage tariff on 
imports from i
Region i’s per unit import tariff expressed as a 
percentage of consumer price. 
Percentage Calculated as the 
ratio between 
consumer and 
producer prices p
i
c
i
p
p  
M Parameter matrix Includes elasticity and policy variables the 
parameterize the EDM.  
Various Various 
X Endogenous variables Relative changes in price and quantity for each 
producing region under the new import 
regime. 
Percentage Obtained after 
solving the EDM 
model. 
Y Market shifters  Policy variables that changed with adoption of 
the new import system 
Various Change in tariff and 
equivalent tariff 
from one import 
system to the other. 
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Table A-7-4 Variables used in Chapter 5 (Welfare Analysis) 
 
Variable Name Description Unit / base year 
Source, 
computation 
iPSΔ  Change in producer 
surplus 
How much producer surplus for region i 
changes as result of the new import regime. 
2004 US $ Calculated from 
Equation X 
(Chapter 5) 
q0 Initial equilibrium 
quantity in region i 
Initial equilibrium quantity imported by the 
EU from region i under the old import regime 
Tons World Trade 
Annual Report of 
the United Nations. 
q1 New equilibrium 
quantity in region i 
New equilibrium quantity imported by the EU 
from region i under the new import regime 
Tons Calculated from the 
EDM model. 
p0 Initial equilibrium 
price in region i 
Initial equilibrium import price from region i 
under the old import regime. 
2004 US $ / ton World Trade 
Annual Report of 
the United Nations. 
p1 New equilibrium 
price in region i 
New equilibrium import price from region i 
under the new import regime 
2004 US $ / ton Calculated from the 
EDM model. 
 
 78
Appendix B - Factor pattern SAS code to impose population correlation on Monte Carlo 
simulated parameters 
data A (type=corr);_type_='corr'; 
 input A1 G12 G13 G14 B1 A0 A2 A3 G23 G24 G34 B2 B3; 
cards; 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-6.66E-02 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 
-0.1264 -1.76E-03 1 . . . . . . . . . . 
-7.72E-02 -6.62E-04 1.02E-02 1 . . . . . . . . . 
 7.92E-03 -6.59E-04 -1.27E-03 -7.73E-04 1 . . . . . . . . 
-4.45E-03 5.33E-03 1.66E-02 7.88E-03 -1.68E-03 1 . . . . . . . 
-0.22786 0.12898 -3.55E-02 -2.11E-02 -2.22E-03 -3.53E-03 1 . . . . .
 . 
-0.26809 -4.65E-02 0.1252 1.07E-02 -2.62E-03 -7.04E-03 -0.3191 1 . . .
 . . 
 3.23E-02 -1.13E-02 -1.23E-03 1.72E-03 3.21E-04 -3.00E-03 -5.94E-02 1.17E-02 1 .
 . . . 
 1.82E-02 -3.67E-03 -8.53E-05 -2.67E-03 1.81E-04 -1.52E-03 -1.67E-02 1.01E-02 1.22E-03
 1 . . . 
 3.97E-02 3.35E-03 -7.89E-03 -9.49E-03 3.98E-04 -4.51E-03 2.79E-02 -2.00E-02 -1.95E-03
 8.11E-04 1 . . 
-2.24E-03 1.27E-03 -3.44E-04 -2.05E-04 -2.24E-05 3.04E-04 6.96E-03 -3.14E-03 -5.85E-04
 -1.64E-04 2.72E-04 1 . 
-2.64E-03 -4.53E-04 1.25E-03 1.12E-04 -2.74E-05 9.37E-04 -3.14E-03 5.60E-03 1.13E-04
 9.78E-05 -2.01E-04 -3.06E-05 1 
; 
proc factor n=13 outstat=facout;/*Stores the factor pattern data into the file facout*/ 
DATA PATTERN; SET FACOUT; 
 IF _TYPE_='PATTERN'; 
 DROP _TYPE__NAME_; 
RUN; 
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